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IDEOLOGY VS. INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 
IN U.S. ENERGY POLICY* 
DAVID E. ADELMAN** & DAVID B. SPENCE*** 
The political economy of energy policy in the United States is 
dominated by a combination of ideological partisanship and 
interest group lobbying. Both are reflected in the widespread 
belief that, under the Obama administration, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (“EPA”) was engaged in a misguided “war 
on coal,” despite the coal industry’s status as the leading 
industrial source of air pollution and compelling evidence that 
the benefits of EPA’s regulations vastly exceed their costs. This 
conflict is persistent and unresolved, notwithstanding repeated 
involvement of the Supreme Court over the last few years. The 
politics of this conflict are compounded by tensions between 
electricity managers and environmental regulators. Much of this 
tension is driven by competing perspectives: EPA’s focus has 
been on the national costs and benefits of its rules, whereas grid 
managers operate regionally. This Article resolves the apparent 
conflicts by downscaling the regulatory analyses of three high-
profile (and highly litigated) EPA rules addressing emissions of 
conventional pollutants, air toxics, and greenhouse gases 
associated with climate change from coal-fired power plants. 
This Article utilizes complementary EPA databases and draws 
on several model estimates to examine the regional impacts—
both costs and benefits—of regulations targeting coal-fired 
power plants. 
Overall, this Article finds that the distribution of both the 
compliance costs and environmental benefits of the rules are 
roughly commensurate with each region’s reliance on coal-fired 
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power plants, particularly older facilities. That is, the benefits of 
reducing emissions under these rules are predominantly local. As 
a consequence, regulatory benefits exceed costs not only at the 
national level but at the regional level as well, and typically by 
large margins. Further, with a few important caveats, we find that 
while the EPA rules will hasten power plant closures, most will 
occur in electricity markets that have sufficient excess capacity to 
mitigate potential threats to electricity supplies and reliability. 
Nevertheless, opposition to the rules persists, which we explain as 
the product of a combination of both interest group and 
ideological/partisan opposition. Interestingly, ideological/
partisan opposition appears to hold greater sway based on 
varying levels of political opposition regionally and may—
incrementally—be shifting in EPA’s favor. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Energy policy in the United States is shaped by ideological 
conflicts between the political parties and powerful interests with 
large assets at stake. While the increasing polarization of American 
politics is well recognized,1 conflicts over regulation of the energy 
sector are especially sharp, inciting repeated interventions by the 
Supreme Court in recent years.2 EPA’s regulation of electric utilities 
has become a focal point of this partisan divide and an ideological 
litmus test for congressional campaigns.3 It is also emblematic of the 
broader trends in congressional politics, characterized by a shift from 
norms of cooperation among centrists of both parties in the 1970s and 
1980s to the dominance of bitter partisanship today.4 In the 1970s, for 
example, a Republican president created EPA,5 and a Democratic 
president oversaw the deregulation of natural gas prices;6 in the 1980s 
 
 1. For a good overview of the various theories of congressional polarization, see 
generally JOHN H. ALDRICH, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF 
POLITICAL PARTIES IN AMERICA (1995) (summarizing the polarization literature); KEITH 
T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF 
ROLL CALL VOTING (1997) (measuring ideological polarization over time and tracing it to 
differences across issue groups); SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN 
CONGRESS (2008) (crediting Congress’s adoption of supermajoritarian procedures); 
Morris P. Fiorina & Samuel J. Abrams, Political Polarization in the American Public, 11 
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 563 (2008) (crediting polarization to party activists, not passive 
partisans). 
 2. For a summary of this litigation, see infra Section I.B. 
 3. Bloomberg reports that more than 14,000 anti-EPA ads and more than 34,000 pro-
coal ads aired in 2014 Senate campaigns, compared to about 5,000 pro-EPA ads and 
another 15,000 pro-green energy ads. See 980,570 Ads, BLOOMBERG POL., http://
www.bloomberg.com/politics/graphics/2014-senate-ads-and-issues/ [https://perma.cc/94AE-
9J5J] (last updated Oct. 13, 2014). 
 4. The most widely cited data on the ideological polarization in Congress are those 
assembled originally in Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE dataset, 
which places members of Congress on an ideological spectrum based upon members’ 
voting behavior. See NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, 
POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 5 (2006); see 
also The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTEVIEW.COM, http://voteview.com
/political_polarization_2014.htm [https://perma.cc/YL47-GET5] (last updated Mar. 21, 
2015). 
 5. See The Guardian: Origins of the EPA, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://
archive.epa.gov/epa/aboutepa/guardian-origins-epa.html [https://perma.cc/9TBQ-TPLP] 
(last updated Sept. 6, 2016). Richard Nixon established EPA from parts of other agencies 
by executive action in 1970. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 199 (1970), 
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 208 (2012). 
 6. See Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Jimmy Carter signed into law the Natural Gas 
Policy Act of 1978, which deregulated wellhead prices in the hopes of stimulating more 
exploration for natural gas. See id. For a description of the early effects of the Natural Gas 
Policy Act, see Richard J. Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition 
in the Natural Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REV. 345, 348–52 (1983). 
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and early 1990s, a bipartisan Congress addressed the problem of acid 
rain and the global threat of ozone losses in the stratosphere,7 and a 
Republican president ran for election as the “environmental 
president.”8 Today, however, the parties are each more ideologically 
homogenous than at any time in the postwar era,9 yet are further 
divided on issues that concern the regulation of the energy industry, 
most notably climate change.10 
Growing partisanship is central to the political stalemate that 
exists over national policies at the intersection of energy and the 
environment, and regulation of coal-fired power plants is its 
epicenter. Congressional gridlock has caused the locus of 
policymaking to revert to the executive branch and the courts.11 This 
movement has incited a backlash in Congress, where the Obama 
administration EPA’s efforts to regulate emissions from coal-fired 
power plants are commonly portrayed as a “war on coal” and a 
regulatory “train wreck.”12 In substance, the debate reflects the 
contrasting visions of energy policy that growing partisanship has 
cultivated between the political parties: one vision, more associated 
with Democrats and the ideological left, is premised on transitioning 
away from fossil fuels and toward cleaner modes of generating 
electricity; another vision, more associated with Republicans and the 
ideological right, is that alternative sources of energy are antithetical 
 
 7. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. IV, VI, 104 Stat. 
2399, 2584–2634, 2648–72 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§	7651–51o, 7671–71a 
(2012)). 
 8. See Opinion, Bush vs. Clinton: What Is an Environmental President?, L.A. TIMES 
(Sept. 27, 1992), http://articles.latimes.com/print/1992-09-27/opinion/op-488_1_environmental-
policy [https://perma.cc/R8XA-SK9K] (noting that this was George H.W. Bush in 1988). 
 9. See The Polarization of Congressional Parties, supra note 4. 
 10. See Ned Resnikoff, Senate Committee Again Debates Existence of Climate Change, 
MSNBC (Jan. 30, 2014, 2:06 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/all-6#49725 [https://perma.cc
/9LEL-J389] (discussing “climate deniers,” including Senator Jim Inhofe’s repeated claims 
that climate change science is a hoax). For scientific assessments showing consensus on the 
issue of climate change, see, for example, NAT’L CLIMATE ASSESSMENT & DEV. 
ADVISORY COMM., U.S. GLOB. CHANGE RES. PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2014), http://s3.amazonaws.com/nca2014/low/NCA3_Climate
_Change_Impacts_in_the_United%20States_LowRes.pdf?download=1 [https://perma.cc
/B9CF-QFHQ]; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Climate Change 
2013: The Physical Science Basis—Summary for Policymakers, at 15, 23 (2013), https://
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg1/WGIAR5_SPM_brochure_en.pdf [https://perma.cc
/7AMS-M975]. 
 11. For a detailed examination of this phenomenon, see generally Jody Freeman & 
David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
 12. See, e.g., JAMES E. MCCARTHY & CLAUDIA COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R41914, EPA’S REGULATION OF COAL-FIRED POWER: IS A “TRAIN WRECK” 
COMING? 7 (2011), http://www.lawandenvironment.com/uploads/file/CRS-EPA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KUA8-37QR]. 
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to energy security and economic prosperity.13 These opposing visions 
are infused with deeper partisan conflicts over the role of government 
in the economy.14 
The ideological barriers to constructive policymaking are 
compounded by high-stakes interest group politics in the electric 
utility sector. Private opposition to EPA’s rules is driven in part by 
the disparities between the concentration of regulatory costs in a 
single industry and diffuse benefits that are shared by the wider 
public. The rules at the center of this debate require fossil-fueled 
power plants to reduce emissions of pollutants associated with a long 
list of adverse health and environmental impacts. The addition of new 
controls will lower the incidence of asthma, birth defects, and 
thousands of premature deaths annually;15 it will also reduce power 
plant emissions of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) that contribute to 
climate change. The political economy16 of EPA’s rules is made more 
challenging by the high stakes. Power plants are the largest industrial 
sources of major air pollutants (including GHGs) in the United 
States,17 and EPA’s rules represent a genuine threat to the economics 
of the coal industry. The Obama administration EPA rules, along 
with rising competition from natural gas-fired power, put coal 
industry and electric utility jobs at risk and are projected to prompt 
the closure of many coal plants. These factors partly explain why coal-
producing states fell solidly for Donald Trump in the 2016 
presidential election.18 Moreover, the potential negative impacts are 
 
 13. See generally ALEX EPSTEIN, THE MORAL CASE FOR FOSSIL FUELS (2014) 
(arguing that there are no significant environmental or other downsides to continued 
extensive reliance on fossil fuels). This stands in sharp contrast to the scientific 
understandings that motivate the EPA rules, the impacts of which are analyzed in this 
Article. 
 14. Poole and Rosenthal describe this ideological divide as one centered on the role 
of government intervention in the economy. See Royce Carroll et al., DW-Nominate 
Scores with Bootstrapped Standard Errors, VOTEVIEW.COM, http://voteview.com/dwnomin
.htm [https://perma.cc/9GNU-SHZC] (last updated Sept. 17, 2015). 
 15. For a more thorough description of these effects, see infra Section I.A. 
 16. The term “political economy” has several meanings in scholarly literature, but is 
used here to refer to the interaction between political action and economic action, in both 
directions—that is, the effects of new laws and regulations on economic actors and their 
decisions, as well as those actors’ attempts to influence lawmaking through political action. 
 17. David E. Adelman, Environmental Federalism when Numbers Matter More Than 
Size, 32 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 238, 287–88 (2014) (noting that in 2005, electric 
utilities accounted for 80% of the SO2 emissions from industrial sources, over 60% of the 
NOx emissions, and over 50% of the PM2.5 emissions). 
 18. See Michael Bastasch, Here’s Why Trump Won Big in Coal Country, DAILY 
CALLER (Nov. 10, 2016, 10:06 AM), http://dailycaller.com/2016/11/10/heres-why-trump-
won-big-in-coal-country/ [https://perma.cc/EVV8-5VPE]; Leigh Paterson & Reid Frazier, 
Coal Country Picked Trump. Now, They Want Him to Keep His Promises, NPR (Jan. 1, 
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not limited to the coal sector; several recent studies suggest that 
retirements of coal plants could undermine the reliability of the 
electric grid as well.19 
Of course, the election of Donald Trump raises the possibility 
that the EPA rules will be repealed or weakened.20 EPA has 
defended its rules on the ground that their benefits exceed the 
respective costs by a wide margin.21 However, the agency’s arguments 
are based on national averages and therefore ignore disparities in the 
geographic distribution of the costs and benefits for each rule.22 This 
analysis is problematic because the costs will not be evenly spread. In 
particular, coal-fired power plants at risk of closure are concentrated 
in the Midwest and Southeast, and coal-producing regions are located 
in just a few eastern and western states.23 The perceived salience of 
such geographic disparities is enhanced by the temporal lags that exist 
between the costs and benefits of EPA’s rules. The economic costs 
(including job losses) are near term and fall on identifiable 
individuals, whereas the benefits will accrue in the future to people 
whom we can count but cannot identify—those who will avoid an 
illness or premature death.24 EPA is therefore advancing the very 
kind of “concentrated costs/diffuse benefits” policies that political 
scientists have long recognized as posing the greatest political 
challenges.25 As a consequence, opposition to EPA’s rules26 has two 
 
2017, 3:06 PM ET), http://www.npr.org/2017/01/01/507693919/coal-country-picked-trump-
now-they-want-him-to-keep-his-promises [https://perma.cc/ZS7M-RFT5]. 
 19. For a more thorough description of these economic impacts, see infra Part III. 
 20. See Steven Mufson & Brady Dennis, Trump Victory Reverses U.S. Energy and 
Environmental Priorities, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/11/09/trump-victory-reverses-u-s-energy-and-environmental-
priorities/?utm_term=.224ea5c09de4 [https://perma.cc/4S2N-3F7D]. 
 21. For a discussion of EPA’s cost-benefit estimates, see infra Section III.C. 
 22. See infra notes 262–67 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra Section III.A. 
 24. See infra notes 301–03 and accompanying text. 
 25. The intuition here is that when costs (or benefits) are concentrated among a very 
few, those few are motivated to apply pressure to their elected representatives in order to 
influence policy, and that that motivation disappears when costs (or benefits) are diffused. 
Thus, political action that imposes costs on a few for the benefit of the many is particularly 
difficult to enact in a representative democracy. Political scientist James Q. Wilson is often 
credited with explaining the political difficulty of enacting these kinds of regulatory 
policies. See James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY: 
READINGS IN THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY 82, 85–89 
(Thomas Ferguson & Joel Rogers eds., 1984); see also THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF 
LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 50–61 (2d ed. 1979). 
 26. See Jean Chemnick, Jay Rockefeller—The Evolution of a Coal State Senator, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/01/18/18greenwire-jay-rockefeller-
the-evolution-of-a-coal-state-s-4772.html?pagewanted=all [https://perma.cc/NT3Z-X25L (staff-
uploaded archive)]; Nick Wing, Joe Manchin Shoots Cap-And-Trade Bill with Rifle in New 
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distinct sources—ideologically opposed Republicans and interest 
group-driven coal-state Democrats.27 
Our purpose here is to examine the relationship between the 
projected costs and benefits of the EPA rules, on the one hand, and 
the politics surrounding their adoption, on the other. This analysis 
uses publicly available data from several EPA datasets28 to explore 
the geographic distribution of the costs and benefits of the EPA rules. 
Part I examines the factual and historical basis of EPA’s complex 
suite of regulations. After briefly describing the virtues of coal-fired 
power in American electricity markets and the externalities 
associated with its air emissions, we review the Clean Air Act 
(“CAA”) rules that comprise the bulk of EPA’s alleged “war” on 
coal-fired electricity generation. 
Part II discusses a recent series of reports analyzing the potential 
effects of EPA’s rules on management of the electric grid and the 
reactions of electricity regulators and other stakeholders to these 
rules. The discussion focuses on the perspectives of regulators whose 
mission is guided by the broader public interest, as opposed to 
nongovernmental actors with an economic or organizational interest 
that predisposes them to either favor or disfavor the EPA rules. Most 
of this commentary raises significant technical questions and is 
strongly or cautiously negative. However, not all the commentary is 
negative: substantial variation exists in the degree of concern 
expressed by federal, regional, and state officials. What is 
unmistakable in the comments is a widespread concern about the 
potential threats EPA’s rules pose to maintaining reliable electricity 
supplies and the importance of regulatory flexibility for maintaining 
grid stability. 
In Part III, in order to explore the effects of EPA regulation on 
the reliability of the electric grid, we utilize several complementary 
EPA datasets to examine the types and geographic distribution of 
coal plants at risk of closure under the new EPA rules. This analysis 
 
Ad, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 11, 2010, 3:53 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10
/11/joe-manchin-ad-dead-aim_n_758457.html [https://perma.cc/AKN8-CNP6]. 
 27. See, e.g., Caroline May, Manchin on EPA Rule: Obama Administration “Deniers”, 
BREITBART (June 3, 2014), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/06/03
/Manchin-on-EPA-Rule-Obama-Administration-Deniers/ [https://perma.cc/7H6A-D9LP] 
(describing Senator Manchin’s opposition to the EPA rule). 
 28. The data analyses presented below utilize data drawn from EPA’s Integrated 
Planning Model (“IPM”) datasets for the MATS rule and CSAPR, IPM 4.10, and the 
more recent dataset for the CPP, IPM 5.13. The data are analyzed from IPMs 4.10 and 
5.13 Base Cases, as well as the datasets EPA generates for each rule, assuming each rule is 
implemented. For the details of the analysis, see infra Part III. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 339 (2017) 
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shows that (1) while the impacts of the EPA rules are not uniform 
across wholesale power markets, they are typically proportional to 
each region’s reliance on coal-fired power; (2) in the few instances 
where a region’s share of the costs of a rule is greater than its share of 
coal-fired generation capacity nationally, it is because the region’s 
fleet is older and smaller, and produces more pollution; (3) regions 
that bear the highest costs receive the greatest benefits because the 
health benefits of the EPA rules are predominantly local; and (4) the 
net benefits of EPA’s rules are positive—and typically by large 
margins—not just nationally, but in every regional power market.29 
With regard to grid stability, the data reveal that the regions 
projected to have the greatest numbers of coal plant closures have 
significant excess generation capacity to mitigate these losses.30 In 
short, we find little evidence to oppose EPA’s rules on either 
economic or distributional grounds. 
Finally, Part IV explores the political economy of EPA’s rules in 
greater detail to answer the following question: why are the highly 
favorable net benefits of EPA’s rules at the national and regional 
levels failing both to foster a more constructive public debate and to 
mitigate the influence of ideological and interest group politics? To 
answer this question, this Article explores the variation in state and 
regional positions on the EPA rules. It notes that some state and 
regional opposition to the rules is consistent with interest group 
politics, and the notion that concentrated economic costs (or the risk 
of such costs in the form of reliability risks) loom larger in the policy 
process than diffuse environmental benefits.31 However, some of the 
regions and states hit hardest by the risk of plant closures have raised 
far stronger objections than others, and much of the variation in state 
and regional position taking on the rules seems more consistent with 
state and regional ideological differences than with interest group 
pressure.32 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF REGULATIONS GOVERNING COAL-FIRED 
ENERGY GENERATION 
Coal has traditionally claimed the lion’s share of the American 
electric generation supply because of its low cost, large domestic 
 
 29. See infra Part III. 
 30. See infra Section III.B. 
 31. See infra notes 295–99 and accompanying text. 
 32. See infra Part IV. 
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reserves, and reliability.33 These characteristics make it exceptionally 
attractive to grid managers as a source of electricity—none of the 
other generation technologies has had such a powerful combination 
of stabilizing attributes.34 However, coal has lost market share to 
natural gas and renewables in recent years, as Figure 1 indicates.  
 
Figure 1: Shares of Electricity Generation: 1950–201635 
Historically, coal-fired and nuclear power plants have had high 
capacity factors,36 while other technologies have been used to serve 
daily or seasonal peaks in demand.37 For this reason, coal-fired and 
 
 33. See infra Figure 1. The United States has the largest coal reserves in the world, 
amounting to more than one-fourth of economically proven reserves globally. 
International Energy Statistics: Total Recoverable Coal, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=1&pid=7&aid=6 [https://perma.cc
/2DPE-HT6J]. The technologies underlying coal generation are very well established and 
robust, and coal has the substantial virtues of being easy to transport and stockpile at 
generation plants, which further enhances its reliability as a fuel for electricity generation. 
See Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 
VAND. L. REV. 141, 165 (2016). 
 34. See Hammond & Spence, supra note 33, at 163–66. By contrast, natural gas-fired 
power plants depend upon supply of fuel in real time over the natural gas pipeline 
network, and renewable sources are beholden to the whims of nature (that is, they depend 
upon the sun shining, the wind blowing, or the water flowing). Supplies of uranium for 
nuclear power are nearly as secure as coal supplies, but nuclear power is more expensive 
than coal-fired power. For an in-depth discussion of the relative reliability of the different 
electric generation technologies, see id. 
 35. Natural Gas Expected to Surpass Coal in Mix of Fuel Used for U.S. Power 
Generation in 2016, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.eia.gov
/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=25392 [https://perma.cc/6BF4-28JC]. 
 36. A plant’s “capacity factor” is the percentage of time it is dispatching power to the 
grid. For example, if a plant is dispatching power to the grid during 7,888 of the 8,765 
hours in a year, its capacity factor is 0.90. 
 37. For the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s (“EIA”) estimates of capacity 
factors of different generation technologies, see U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED 
COST AND LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE 
95 N.C. L. REV. 339 (2017) 
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nuclear power are characterized as “base load technologies.”38 Energy 
generation sources are distinguished on these bases because power is 
dispatched to the grid on an as-needed basis to serve load; 
accordingly, plants with the lowest marginal costs are dispatched first, 
subject to the need to avoid grid congestion and to maintain 
reliability.39 Thus, as EPA rules aimed at the pollution harm 
associated with coal combustion increase the costs of operating coal-
fired power plants, they in turn influence the frequency with which 
those plants are dispatched. 
A. Widespread Health and Environmental Impacts 
A growing number of studies are revealing that the technical and 
economic virtues of coal-fired power are overshadowed by their 
singularly large pollution externalities. Coal combustion produces a 
variety of air pollutants, including: (1) carbon dioxide (“CO2”), the 
most common GHG; (2) sulfur dioxide (“SO2”), a precursor of acid 
rain and particulate matter; (3) nitrogen oxides (“NOx”), precursors 
of both acid rain and ground-level ozone (smog); (4) other forms of 
fine particulate matter (“PM” or “PM2.5”), a major contributor to 
premature human mortality; and (5) mercury, a neurological toxin.40 
Coal-fired power plants are the largest sources of SO2 and mercury in 
the United States.41 As Table 1 indicates, coal plants emit nearly twice 
 
ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2016 6 (2016), http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf
/electricity_generation.pdf [https://perma.cc/W25T-5NP8]. 
 38. For a more detailed discussion of base load technologies, see Hammond & 
Spence, supra note 33, at 157–66 (defining base load as “the portion of demand that is 
relatively constant and in need of service most of the time”). A base load plant may have a 
capacity factor of 75%, meaning that it is operating and dispatching power to the grid 75% 
of the time during the year. A peaking plant may have a capacity factor as low as 5%. 
 39. See FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, SECURITY CONSTRAINED ECONOMIC 
DISPATCH: DEFINITION, PRACTICES, ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5 (2006), http://
www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/joint-boards/final-cong-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc
/G2QS-MZWW]. This rule of operation is referred to as “security constrained economic 
dispatch” (“SCED”). Id. 
 40. See Coal & the Environment, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov
/energyexplained/?page=coal_environment [https://perma.cc/5CLN-HZSX]; What is Acid 
Rain?, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/acidrain/what-acid-rain 
[https://perma.cc/QPA2-YXWV] (last updated Mar. 31, 2016). 
 41. See D. KOSSON ET AL., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHARACTERIZATION OF 
COAL COMBUSTION RESIDUES FROM ELECTRIC UTILITIES—LEACHING AND 
CHARACTERIZATION DATA 5 (2009), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/P1007JBD
.PDF?Dockey=P1007JBD.PDF [https://perma.cc/5D5X-RNMT]; U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., NATURAL GAS 1998: ISSUES AND TRENDS 51 (1999), http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil
_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/natural_gas_1998_issues_trends/pdf/it98.pdf [https://
perma.cc/J35D-CL4D]. 
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the CO2 and many times the NOx, PM, and SO2 as power plants that 
use other fossil fuels to generate electricity.42 
 
Table 1: Air Emissions from Combustion of Different Fossil Fuels43 
 
 Source (lbs/Billion Btu) 
Pollutant Natural Gas Oil Coal 
Carbon Dioxide 117,000 164,000 208,000 
Nitrogen Oxides 92 448 457 
Sulfur Dioxides 0.6 1,122 2,591 
Particulates 7 84 2,744 
 
Coal combustion produces more harm to human health and the 
environment than any other industrial source. A 2009 National 
Academy of Sciences study estimated the annual non-climate-related 
external damages from coal-fired power plants to be $62 billion, 
representing about thirty percent of the average retail price of 
electricity.44 A more comprehensive 2011 study, reported in American 
Economic Review, quantified the damages from conventional air 
pollutants for 820 industries.45 The study found that the net benefits46 
of only seven of the industries (including coal-fired power) were 
negative,47 and that coal-fired power plants produced by far the 
 
 42. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 41, at 58. Of course, nuclear power and 
renewable generation produce none of these emissions, though all forms of power 
generation produce emissions when the full life cycle of the technology is considered. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Press Release, Nat’l Academies, Report Examines Hidden Health and 
Environmental Costs of Energy Production and Consumption in U.S. (Oct. 19, 2009), 
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=12794 [https://perma
.cc/62DG-STDT] (equating these non-climate damages to be about 3.2 cents per kilowatt-
hour (“kWh”)); see also Average Retail Electricity Prices in the U.S. from 1990 to 2015, 
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/183700/us-average-retail-electricity-price-since-
1990/ [https://perma.cc/L2YE-7UH2] (reporting the average retail price of electricity in 
2015 to be 10.42 cents per kWh). 
 45. See Nicholas Z. Muller, Robert Mendelsohn & William Nordhaus, Environmental 
Accounting for Pollution in the United States Economy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1649, 1664 
(2011). In CAA parlance, “conventional” pollutants are distinguished from toxic 
pollutants like mercury, and from GHGs. 
 46. Specifically, the results were expressed in terms of net costs—the ratio of 
environmental damages to value added for each industry. Id. 
 47. Id. at 1665 tbl.2. The ratio of environmental damage to value added was higher for 
oil-fired generation (5.13) than coal-fired generation (2.20), and even higher for solid 
waste combustion and incineration (6.72). Id. The ratio for natural gas-fired generation 
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largest amount of environmental damages, estimated at $53 billion 
per year.48 Similarly, a second 2011 study conducted by public health 
experts calculated that the annual life cycle health and environmental 
costs of coal to the American public were as high as half a trillion 
dollars49 and “conservatively” estimated that internalizing these costs 
would “double[] to triple[]” the price of electricity generated from 
coal.50 These harms are orders of magnitude greater than those 
produced by other electric generation sources.51 In terms of the 
overall U.S. economy, “[c]oal plants are responsible for more than 
one-fourth of [gross environmental damage (“GED”)],” and the coal 
sector causes harms that are “larger than the combined GED due to 
the three next most polluting industries.”52 
Emissions from American coal plants also represent a significant 
contribution to the harms from coal-fired electricity generation 
globally. According to the World Bank, just three countries—the 
United States, China, and India—accounted for almost 70% of the 
electricity generated globally from coal in 2010, while the countries 
outside the top ten collectively accounted for just 13% of the global 
total.53 Per capita, the United States is more reliant on coal than any 
of the other leading countries; even China’s per capita coal generation 
is only about 40% of that in the United States.54 Moreover, China, 
 
was just 0.34, however, denoting a positive cost ratio for that industry. Id. at 1670 tbl.5. 
Moreover, the study did not assess the cost of carbon dioxide emissions as part of the 
analysis. Id. at 1664. 
 48. Id. at 1665. The next largest amount of damage was associated with the livestock 
production industry at $14.8 billion. Id. By contrast, environmental damages from natural 
gas-fired production were estimated to be less than $1 billion per year. Id. at 1669. 
 49. Paul R. Epstein et al., Full Cost Accounting for the Life Cycle of Coal, 1219 ANN. 
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 73, 73 (2011). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Epstein and his coauthors put the number of annual deaths from all electric 
generation at 13,200. Id. at 91. Researchers at NASA and Columbia University estimate 
that nuclear power has averted 1.84 million air pollution-related deaths worldwide that 
would have resulted from fossil fuel combustion but for reliance on nuclear energy. See 
Pushker A. Kharecha & James E. Hansen, Prevented Mortality and Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Historical and Projected Nuclear Power, 47 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 4889, 
4891 (2013). 
 52. Muller et al., supra note 45, at 1667. 
 53. This analysis is based on data originally downloaded from the World Bank 
DataBank, see Indicators, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator [https://
perma.cc/4XCE-BXL5], and is on file with the North Carolina Law Review; see also 
Primary Coal Consumption 2010, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/beta
/international/rankings/#?prodact=7-2&cy=2010&pid=7&aid=2&tl_id=2-A&tl_type=a [https://
perma.cc/CR5C-GJCD]. 
 54. India is an outlier here with just 0.53 megawatt-hours (“MWh”) per person 
generated from coal, in contrast to the 6.45 MWh per person in the United States, making 
per capita generation from coal twelve times greater than in India. Id. Further, in terms of 
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India, and the United States are projected to dominate the global 
market for coal and coal-fired power generation for the foreseeable 
future,55 with U.S. per capita generation continuing to exceed the 
levels in China and India by a substantial margin.56 It is against this 
backdrop that we consider recent efforts to address emissions from 
coal combustion in the United States, the wealthiest of the big three 
coal-fired power producers.57 
The widespread harms associated with coal-fired power reflect 
major gaps in the CAA regulatory regime. The basic structure of that 
regime was created in 1970 and distinguishes between conventional 
pollutants (the most commonly emitted pollutants from industrial and 
mobile sources) and more hazardous or toxic pollutants, which are 
subject to more stringent and comprehensive regulation.58 The CAA 
has been amended on several occasions since 1970, most recently in 
1990, without altering this basic distinction between conventional and 
toxic pollutants.59 Nonetheless, that statute and EPA regulations 
exempt a significant number of coal-fired power plants—often 
through lax grandfathering provisions—and emissions levels still vary 
greatly between plants.60 The forty-five-year history of the CAA is 
replete with battles in Congress, the executive branch, and the courts 
over attempts to bring all coal plants up to modern pollution control 
standards. The struggle to control emissions from the oldest and 
dirtiest coal plants dates back to the 1980s and includes both 
innovative initiatives, such as the acid rain pollution-trading 
 
per capita reliance on coal-based electricity, only Australia generated more from coal per 
capita than the United States, but it generates less than one-tenth the quantity of 
electricity annually. Id. 
 55. MATTHIAS FINKENRATH, JULIAN SMITH & DENNIS VOLK, INT’L ENERGY 
AGENCY, CCS RETROFIT: ANALYSIS OF THE GLOBALLY INSTALLED COAL-FIRED 
POWER PLANT FLEET 35–36 (2012), https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications
/publication/CCS_Retrofit.pdf [https://perma.cc/2KCN-L8XJ] (noting that these three 
countries will account for eighty-six percent of the new coal-fired power plants constructed 
globally through 2035). 
 56. See supra note 53. 
 57. WORLD BANK, THE CHANGING WEALTH OF NATIONS: MEASURING SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 162–63, 165, 168 (2011), http://documents
.worldbank.org/curated/en/630181468339656734/pdf/588470PUB0Weal101public10BOX3538
16B.pdf [https://perma.cc/MTH3-R6RL]. 
 58. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE CLEAN AIR ACT IN A NUTSHELL: HOW IT 
WORKS 3, 10, 12–13 (2013), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-05/documents
/caa_nutshell.pdf [https://perma.cc/D659-4GXY]. 
 59. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§	7401 to 7671a (2012)); see also Adelman, supra note 17, at 
264–65 (noting that the 1990 amendments “did little to alter the central framework of the 
CAA”). 
 60. See infra Part III. 
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program,61 and long-running battles over so-called “new source 
review.”62 Indeed, two of the EPA rules examined here—the rules on 
interstate transport of conventional air pollutants63 and emissions of 
toxic pollutants from coal-fired plants64—are just the latest rounds of 
regulatory battles that date back to the 1990s.65 Among the CAA 
rules that comprise EPA’s alleged war on coal, only the rules 
governing GHG emissions are of relatively recent vintage. We turn to 
those rules in the next section. 
B. The Protracted History of EPA’s Air Pollution Rules 
Critics of EPA’s regulatory agenda point to a long list of recent 
agency initiatives aimed at fossil-fueled power plants, including new 
rules addressing water pollution discharges,66 the handling of coal ash 
as a solid waste,67 and the use of cooling water.68 However, critics view 
 
 61. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. IV, 104 Stat. 
2399, 2584–634, 2648–72 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§	7651–51o (2012)). 
 62. This was a decades-long conflict over agency and environmental group attempts 
to extend CAA requirements to older power plants. For a description of this issue, see 
generally Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007). 
 63. See infra Section I.B.1. 
 64. See infra Section I.B.2. 
 65. For an explanation of these rules and their ancestry, see infra Section I.B. 
 66. On June 7, 2013, EPA proposed a rule under the Clean Water Act that would set 
the first federal limits on toxic metals in wastewater that can be discharged from steam 
electric power plants. Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Steam 
Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 78 Fed. Reg. 34,432, 34,435 (proposed 
June 7, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 423). EPA estimated that fewer than half of 
all coal-fired plants would incur costs to comply with the proposed rule because most 
already have technology in place that would be compliant. Id. at 34,469. 
 67. In 2010, EPA proposed to regulate the disposal of fly ash and bottom ash—known 
in an EPA proposed rule as “coal combustion residuals,” or “CCRs”—in surface 
impoundments or landfills under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 
(“RCRA”). Hazardous and Solid Waste Management System; Identification and Listing 
of Special Wastes; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 35,128, 35,128 (proposed June 21, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 261, 264, 
265, 268, 271, 302). Other methods of coal ash disposal remain exempt from RCRA 
regulation under the Bevill determination. Hazardous and Solid Waste Management 
System; Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals from Electric Utilities, 80 Fed. Reg. 
21,302, 21,309 (Apr. 17, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 257, 261) (deferring final 
action on disposal in landfills and surface impoundments and retaining an exemption for 
beneficial use).  
 68. In 2011, EPA proposed new requirements aimed at reducing fish entrainment at 
cooling water intake structures associated with existing power plants and industrial 
facilities and modifying the rule for new facilities. National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System—Cooling Water Intake Structures at Existing Facilities and Phase I 
Facilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 22,174, 22,174 (proposed Apr. 20, 2011) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 122, 125). EPA estimates that all steam electric generating facilities will be affected by 
this rule, and estimates total annualized compliance costs at a 3% discount rate for 
facilities covered by this rule to be $384 million, of which approximately $318 million will 
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the agency’s Clean Air Act rules as the heart of the war on coal,69 
particularly the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (“CSAPR”), the 
Mercury and Air Toxics Standards (“MATS”) rule, and the Clean 
Power Plan (“CPP”), targeting GHG emissions from existing power 
plants.70 This Section briefly describes the key provisions of the EPA 
rules and the legal battles they have generated. Two seemingly 
contradictory patterns emerge from the descriptions: (1) the highly 
protracted and intensely litigated nature of the rulemaking processes 
and (2) the strength of the environmental, human health, and 
economic grounds for promulgating them. 
1.  The Cross-State Air Pollution Rule 
The foundation of the CAA’s regulation of conventional 
pollutants (including SO2, PM, and ozone) is the establishment of 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) for each such 
pollutant.71 The statute directs EPA to set the NAAQS at a level that 
 
fall on steam electric generators. Id. at 22,218–19 (exhibit VII-3). EPA and industry 
disagree over the likely economic effects of these costs on electric generating units. NAM 
D. PHAM & DANIEL J. IKENSON, NPD CONSULTING, A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE 
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF EPA REGULATIONS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY 5 (2012), http://
www.nam.org/Issues/Energy-and-Environment/EPA-Overregulation/A-Critical-Review-of-
the-Benefits-and-Costs-of-EPA-Regulations-on-the-U_S_-Economy/ [https://perma.cc/B9S5-
QH8T]. EPA projects that compliance costs will average only a few hundredths of a cent 
per kWh of electricity generated. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—
Cooling Water Intake Structures at Existing Facilities and Phase I Facilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 
at 22,228–29 (exhibit VII-11). 
 69. See, e.g., Larry Bell, Opinion, Clean Air Act: EPA’s Charade to Justify War on 
Coal Plants, FORBES (Jan. 14, 2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrybell/2014/01
/14/clean-air-act-epas-charade-to-justify-war-on-coal-plants/print/ [https://perma.cc/EC3Q-
TBRT (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 70. EPA has also proposed revisions to its NAAQS for PM, ozone, and NOx, which in 
turn impact coal-fired power plants indirectly. The Obama EPA has initiated, completed, 
or is considering three important NAAQS revisions that may have important effects on 
fossil-fired power plants. In 2010, EPA revised the NAAQS for SO2. Primary National 
Ambient Air Quality Standard for Sulfur Dioxide, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,520, 35,520 (June 22, 
2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50, 53, 58). EPA revised the NAAQS for ozone in 
2015. National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 80 Fed. Reg. 65,292, 65,292 
(Oct. 26, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 50–53, 58). EPA is considering revising the 
current annual NAAQS for PM, but has not yet proposed a revision. Its internal review 
documents indicate it is considering making the standards more stringent. See U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, POLICY ASSESSMENT FOR THE REVIEW OF THE PARTICULATE MATTER 
NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS ES-1 to -3 (2011), http://www.epa.gov
/ttn/naaqs/standards/pm/data/20110419pmpafinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/UEE4-VVXY]. 
However, because the effects of NAAQS revisions on coal-fired power plants are dwarfed 
by the effects of these other rules that regulate the sector more directly, this analysis does 
not address NAAQS revisions. 
 71. Clean Air Act §	109, 42 U.S.C. §	7409 (2012). 
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will “protect the public health” with “an adequate margin of safety.”72 
States with air quality control regions that do not comply with the 
NAAQS (so-called nonattainment areas) are required to develop 
plans for coming into compliance with the NAAQS and to ensure 
that other regions in attainment with the standards remain in 
compliance.73 Fossil-fueled power plants built or modified after 
passage of the CAA must obtain permits covering their emissions of 
conventional pollutants,74 and whether the plant is located in an 
attainment or nonattainment area determines the stringency of the 
plant’s permitted emissions limits.75 
EPA has struggled for two decades to issue regulations 
governing the interstate transport of ozone precursors from the 
Midwest and the South that cause NAAQS violations in downwind 
states in the East.76 After years of pressure from northeastern states77 
and Congress, the Clinton administration EPA established a more 
stringent ozone standard in 199778 and promulgated a rule in 1998 
 
 72. Id. §	109(b)(1). 
 73. Id. §	110. 
 74. Id. §	111(a)(2) (applying the CAA standards to new and modified sources). 
 75. See id. §§	165, 173. New sources located in nonattainment areas face more 
stringent requirements, including the requirement that their permit reflect the “lowest 
achievable emission rate” for the pollutant in question, and the requirement to obtain 
“offsets” (reductions in emissions from existing sources) to make room for their emissions. 
See id. §	173. 
 76. Violations of the ozone NAAQS are largely attributable to local vehicle 
emissions, but the problem is exacerbated by the interstate transport of ozone and its 
precursors, particularly NOx, emitted by fossil-fueled power plants. See Controlling Air 
Pollution from Motor Vehicles, N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, http://
www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/8394.html [https://perma.cc/GL67-G8H2] (“In many urban 
areas, motor vehicles are the single largest contributor to ground-level ozone which is a 
common component of smog.”); Ozone—The Pollution Paradox, N.Y. DEP’T OF ENVTL. 
CONSERVATION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/8561.html [https://perma.cc/Z3PR-
AN9G] (“[O]zone formation occurs most commonly over cities with large numbers of 
industries, power plants and vehicles	.	.	.	.”). 
 77. The Clean Air Act’s so-called “good neighbor provision” addresses the interstate 
transport of air emissions by requiring states to include provisions in their State 
Implementation Plans (“SIPs”) to regulate emissions “which will	.	.	.	contribute 
significantly to nonattainment [with a NAAQS in a downwind state].” §	110(a)(2)(D). 
After Congress added the good neighbor provision to the statute in 1990, EPA and several 
states formed the Ozone Transport Assessment Group (“OTAG”). See Finding of 
Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the OTAG Region for 
Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,360–61 (Oct. 
27, 1998) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 75, 96). 
 78. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856, 
38,858 (July 18, 1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50). The existing standard, which was 
expressed in terms of a one-hour average limit, was replaced by an eight-hour standard at 
a level of 0.08 parts per million (ppm); the new standard was generally considered to be 
more stringent. Id. 
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designed to control ozone emissions regionally by (1) restricting 
emissions of ozone precursors from twenty-two states in the eastern 
half of the country, (2) specifically mandating that power plants 
account for a significant portion of the reductions, and 
(3)	establishing a voluntary cap-and-trade program to minimize the 
costs of the reductions.79 The Bush administration EPA replaced the 
Clinton EPA rule in 2005 with its own, less stringent Clean Air 
Interstate Rule (“CAIR”).80 Progress was interrupted, however, in 
July 2008 when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit overturned CAIR for, among other things, failing to 
ensure that upwind contributions to NAAQS violations would be 
reduced.81 After initially vacating the rule, the court granted EPA’s 
petition to leave it in place pending amendments conforming to the 
court’s decision.82 
The Obama administration EPA was left with the CAIR 
program in limbo. It responded to the D.C. Circuit decision with a 
new rule of its own, the CSAPR, that was promulgated in August 
2011.83 The saga continued in the courts with a successful industry 
challenge in the D.C. Circuit, which struck CSAPR down in August 
2012,84 followed by a June 2014 Supreme Court verdict in EPA v. 
EME Homer City Generation, L.P.85 that overturned the D.C. Circuit 
decision and upheld the rule.86 The CSAPR requires twenty-seven 
states to reduce power plant emissions of SO2 and NOx that 
contribute to ozone or fine particle pollution in downwind states.87 
The SO2 emissions reductions mandated by the rule are dramatic: 
 
 79. See Finding of Significant Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the 
OTAG Region for Purposes of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone, 63 Fed. Reg. at 
57,356, 57,407–14, 57,456. This rule is known as the “NOx SIP Call” because it required 
states to submit revised SIPs describing plans to implement these additional restrictions. 
See id. at 57,356, 57,361. 
 80. Clean Air Interstate Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162, 25,162 (May 12, 2005) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 96) (imposing SO2 and NOx emission limits 
(“budgets”) on twenty-eight eastern states and the District of Columbia). 
 81. North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896, 901, 907 (D.C. Cir. 2008), on reh’g in part, 
550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 82. North Carolina v. EPA, 550 F.3d 1176, 1177–78 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 83. Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter 
and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 8, 2011) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 72, 78, 97). 
 84. EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 696 F.3d 7, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 
134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). 
 85. 134 S. Ct. 1584 (2014). 
 86. Id. at 1593. 
 87. Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter 
and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,208. 
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emissions would decline to seventy-three percent below 2005 levels in 
the covered states by 2014.88 EPA estimates that the rule will impose 
compliance costs on the power sector of about $2.4 billion annually 
when fully implemented89 and render about 4.8 gigawatts (“GW”)90 of 
coal-fired generation uneconomic.91 EPA estimates that the 
monetized benefit will be $110 to $250 billion per year.92 
2.  The Mercury and Air Toxics Standards 
The fight over whether (and how stringently) to regulate 
mercury emissions from power plants has an even longer lineage, 
spanning three decades. Despite evidence in the late 1980s that the 
accumulation of mercury in the food chain was associated with 
increased incidences of birth defects and neurological damage in 
humans, EPA continued to defer regulating mercury emissions from 
coal-fired power plants.93 Spurred by a congressional directive in the 
1990 amendments to the CAA, the Clinton administration EPA 
prepared studies of mercury emissions94 and concluded that 
 
 88. Id. at 48,349. Additionally, CSAPR is projected to reduce emissions of CO2 from 
electrical generating units by about 25 million metric tons annually. Id. at 48,311. 
 89. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (RIA) FOR THE 
FINAL TRANSPORT RULE 255 (2011) [hereinafter CSAPR RIA], https://www3.epa.gov
/ttnecas1/docs/ria/transport_ria_final-csapr_2011-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/5VPU-EFJF] 
(estimating $800 million in annualized compliance costs); Gabriel Nelson, EPA Orders 
Power Plants to Clean Up Interstate Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2011), http://www
.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/07/07/07greenwire-epa-orders-power-plants-to-clean-up-interstate-
87138.html [https://perma.cc/26AE-KZET (staff-uploaded archive)] (explaining that the 
$2.4 billion CSPAR cost includes $1.6 billion in existing costs under CAIR). EPA 
estimates the benefits of the rule, primarily in the form of tens of thousands of premature 
deaths avoided, to be significantly greater than this number. See Federal Implementation 
Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone and Correction of SIP 
Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,350. 
 90. In the context of electric generation, a power plant’s potential to generate (its 
capacity) is measured in watts (or megawatts (“MW”)). The amount of electricity it 
produces is measured in watt-hours. For example, a 100 MW plant operating at full 
capacity for one hour generates 100 MWh of electricity. One GW is equal to 1,000 MW, 
which is equal to 1,000,000 kilowatts (“KW”), which is equal to 1,000,000,000 watts. 
 91. Federal Implementation Plans: Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter 
and Ozone and Correction of SIP Approvals, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,346. 
 92. CSAPR RIA, supra note 89, at 1. For updates to the rule and its implementation, 
see Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, U.S. ENTVL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov
/csapr/ [https://perma.cc/Y3L9-6927] (last updated Nov. 7, 2016). 
 93. Michael B. Gerrard, Supreme Court Ruling on Mercury Shows Little Deference to 
EPA, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 10, 2015), http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites
/climate-change/supreme_court_ruling_on_mercury_shows_little_deference_to_epa
_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ3E-TSPY]. 
 94. For examples of the mercury studies, see generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
MERCURY STUDY REPORT TO CONGRESS (1997), https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/atw/112nmerc
/volume1.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQZ2-VCAQ]; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STUDY OF 
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regulating them as an air toxic was “appropriate and necessary.”95 
This finding would have led the Clinton administration EPA to 
propose stringent technology-based mercury standards for new and 
existing power plants.96 This strategy went too far for the Bush 
administration, however, which reversed the Clinton EPA’s finding 
on the mode of regulation—treating mercury as a conventional 
pollutant rather than an air toxic.97 The alternate legal framework 
adopted a less stringent “cap-and-trade” system for mercury 
emissions that was limited to new power plants.98 
The courts figure prominently here as well. By 2008, the D.C. 
Circuit had struck down the Bush EPA mercury rule,99 setting the 
stage for the Obama administration EPA to promulgate its MATS 
rule in February 2012.100 The new rule, unsurprisingly, prompted a 
broad array of industry and environmental petitioners to challenge it 
in court. The D.C. Circuit rejected those challenges in 2014,101 but the 
Supreme Court struck down the MATS rule in the spring 2015 case 
Michigan v. EPA.102 The Court rejected EPA’s conclusion that it need 
not consider costs in determining whether regulating mercury 
emissions from coal-fired power plants was “appropriate.”103 EPA 
had performed a cost-benefit analysis for the MATS rule, but not in 
conjunction with its initial decision to regulate.104 The EPA cost-
benefit analysis estimated that annual compliance costs for the 
 
HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC STEAM GENERATING 
UNITS—FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (1998), https://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi
/2000NXFY.PDF?Dockey=2000NXFY.PDF [https://perma.cc/B7EE-PF89]. 
 95. Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric 
Utility Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,825–27 (Dec. 20, 2000). 
 96. See id. at 79,830. Section 112 of the Clean Air Act specifies that permits for toxic 
pollutants must reflect “maximum achievable control technology” (“MACT”). Clean Air 
Act §	112(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. §	7412(d)(3) (2012). 
 97. See Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of 
Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and the Removal 
of Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units from the Section 112(c) 
List, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,994, 15,994 (Mar. 29, 2005) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). 
 98. Id. at 16,005. 
 99. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 578 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 100. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-
Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-
Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-
Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63). 
 101. White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1229 (2014), rev’d sub 
nom. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
 102. 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015). 
 103. Id. at 2711–12. 
 104. Id. at 2705–06. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 339 (2017) 
358 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
electric power industry would be about $9.6 billion and that the rule 
would have negligible net impacts on jobs.105 The agency estimated 
that the net benefits of the new rule would be $27 to $80 billion and 
that most of them would be derived from avoided human illnesses 
and premature deaths.106 On April 25, 2016, EPA effectively 
reinstated the rule by reiterating its conclusion—this time after 
considering costs—that regulating mercury as a toxic pollutant is 
appropriate.107 Industry and several states have further countered that 
the estimated costs of the MATS rule do not adequately assess its 
potential to undermine electric power reliability when coal-fired 
power plants are taken offline faster than they can be replaced. As 
discussed further below, EPA rejects this contention and maintains 
that industry compliance with the MATS rule would not adversely 
affect the reliability of electricity generation or transmission 
systems.108 
3.  The Clean Power Plan: Controlling Greenhouse Gases from  
Existing Power Plants 
The Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA109 
established the legal basis for EPA to regulate GHG emissions from 
 
 105. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-
Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-
Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-
Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9425–26. Industry 
assessments, however, project much greater job losses and slightly higher costs. See ANNE 
E. SMITH ET AL., NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, AN ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS OF 
EPA’S MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS STANDARDS RULE 2, 5 (2012), http://www.nera.com
/content/dam/nera/publications/archive2/PUB_MATS_Rule_0312.pdf [https://perma.cc/SF3B-
9Q3R]. 
 106. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL 
MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS STANDARDS ES-1 (2011) [hereinafter MATS RIA], http://www
.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/matsriafinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AK9-5CCX]. Crucially, 
these benefits include the effects of the MATS rule on reductions of non-mercury as well 
as mercury emissions, and in dicta, the Court questioned EPA’s practice of including these 
“co-benefits” in its cost-benefit analysis. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2706, 2711. 
 107. Supplemental Finding That It Is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate 
Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating 
Units, 81 Fed. Reg. 24,420, 24,420 (Apr. 25, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63). The 
rule had remained in effect pending EPA’s reissue of its “appropriate and necessary” 
decision, so technically the rule did not need to be reinstated. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2712. 
 108. National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-
Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-
Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-
Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. at 9407. 
 109. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
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any source covered by the CAA.110 In September 2013, EPA initiated 
the process of regulating GHG emissions from power plants under 
the New Source Performance Standards (“NSPS”) program, which 
covers only new or modified fossil-fueled power plants,111 and 
finalized the NSPS in August 2015.112 Once EPA sets a standard for 
new sources of GHGs, CAA section 111(d) requires states to set 
“standards of performance” for certain existing sources under their 
jurisdiction, and these standards must conform with EPA 
guidelines.113 In June 2014, EPA proposed the CPP,114 which was 
finalized in October 2015.115 The rule encompasses a set of state-level 
goals and guidelines for regulation of CO2 emissions from existing 
power plants which, pursuant to CAA section 111(d), must reflect 
“the best system of emission reduction which	.	.	.	has been adequately 
demonstrated” (“BSER”), considering (among other things) 
compliance costs.116 
The CPP guidelines address CO2 emissions from fossil-fueled 
power plants, offering states the option of applying EPA-specified 
GHG emissions limitations directly to existing coal- and gas-fired 
generators or achieving similar reductions indirectly by substituting 
lower-emitting generators for coal-fired plants.117 Specifically, states 
choosing these indirect approaches must meet EPA’s emissions 
reduction goal for the state, which in turn is based upon a 
combination of three “building blocks”: (1) enhancing the efficiency 
of coal-fired generation; (2) increasing the dispatch of natural gas-
fired generators in place of coal-fired generators; and (3) expanding 
 
 110. Id. at 528–29. After Massachusetts v. EPA, the agency initiated a number of other 
GHG regulatory initiatives, one of which (its so-called “tailoring rule”) was subsequently 
struck down by the Supreme Court. That decision, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 
contains an instructive description of EPA’s post-Massachusetts v. EPA GHG initiatives. 
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2436–38 (2014). 
 111. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392, 22,392 (proposed Apr. 13, 
2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 112. Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New Stationary 
Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,510, 64,510 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 113. Clean Air Act §	111(d), 42 U.S.C. §	7411(d) (2012). 
 114. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,830 (proposed June 18, 2014) 
[hereinafter Proposed Clean Power Plan] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 115. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,662 (Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Clean 
Power Plan] (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
 116. See §	111(a)(1). 
 117. Clean Power Plan, supra note 115, at 64,662–66. 
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the use of zero-emission sources like renewables.118 The guidelines 
also contemplate compliance by way of participation in multistate 
GHG permit trading programs.119 Twenty-seven states have 
challenged the rule in court.120 If the EPA regulations survive legal 
challenges, they will further erode the competitiveness of coal-fired 
power plants. EPA estimates that the annual costs of the CPP will rise 
to approximately $5.1 to $8.4 billion in 2030 but that they will remain 
far lower than the estimated benefits of $71 to $92 billion per year.121 
II.  EPA’S REGULATIONS VIEWED FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF GRID 
REGULATORS 
Opposition to EPA’s rules has produced a blizzard of 
commentary on potential threats to stable supplies of electricity and 
grid management. As a preliminary matter, it is important to 
recognize that comments on proposed rules may be skewed toward 
the negative: affected parties may be more motivated to comment on 
rules that they perceive to pose a risk to their livelihood or goals.122 
 
 118. Id. at 64,667. 
 119. Id. at 64,664. 
 120. E&E’s Power Plan Hub, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC, http://www.eenews.net
/interactive/clean_power_plan#legal_challenge_status [https://perma.cc/MC5Y-KVBT]. 
The plaintiffs’ motion to stay the effect of the rule pending their legal challenge was 
initially rejected by the D.C. Circuit in early 2016 but ultimately granted by the Supreme 
Court in an unprecedented decision on February 9, 2016. See Order in Pending Case, 
Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, No. 15A787 (U.S. Feb. 9, 2016); Adam Liptak & Coral 
Davenport, Supreme Court Deals Blow to Obama’s Effort to Regulate Coal Emissions, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/10/us/politics/supreme-court-
blocks-obama-epa-coal-emissions-regulations.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/J28L-NWR8 (staff-
uploaded archive)]. The D.C. Circuit is considering the case en banc and heard oral 
argument in September 2016. See Johnathan H. Adler, Clean Power Plan to Get 
Unanticipated En Banc Review, WASH. POST (May 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/05/16/clean-power-plan-to-get-unanticipated-en-banc-
review/?utm_term=.09de6dbcf4a6 [https://perma.cc/Q4VT-TZ9R]. For a more thorough 
discussion of state opposition to this rule, see infra Table 10. 
 121. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE CLEAN 
POWER PLAN FINAL RULE ES-9, ES-20 to -21 (2015) [hereinafter CPP RIA, FINAL 
RULE], https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/cpp-final-rule-ria
.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5MC-WZJ8] (applying a seven percent discount rate and including 
climate benefits plus health co-benefits). Similar to the other rules, the projected benefits 
of the CPP far exceed its projected costs, but similar to the MATS rule, the benefit 
estimates for the CPP are also dominated by non-GHG co-benefits. Id. 
 122. One of the earliest heuristics identified by behavioral economists Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky was our heightened sensitivity to the risk of loss. That is, 
we experience a smaller increase in utility from a gain of $X than the decrease in utility we 
experience from losing $X. This experimental result is very robust. See Daniel Kahneman 
& Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 342 (1982) 
(illustrating individuals’ stronger preference for avoiding losses than for realizing 
equivalent gains). 
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Consequently, grid managers who do not perceive a threat to the grid 
from EPA rules may have been less likely to submit comments. That 
observation aside, the most prevalent concern expressed in the 
comments was that EPA’s rules would prompt closure of too many 
coal-fired power plants too quickly.123 This issue could arise if the 
rules require power plants to install pollution controls that render 
them uneconomic in wholesale power markets. If too many plants 
retire, or if they cannot be replaced with new capacity in a timely 
manner, the resulting shortfall in generating capacity could endanger 
system reliability. Proponents of EPA’s rules believe these concerns 
are misplaced. They claim that coal plants are being driven out of the 
market by competition from natural gas-fired power plants and 
renewables124 and that EPA’s rules hasten that process only at the 
margins.125 The opposing camp views EPA’s rules as the primary 
driver of this decline.126 Most of the critical commentary has focused 
on the MATS rule and the CPP,127 which are also the most costly of 
these rules.128 This disagreement has produced two waves of technical 
reports: one following the proposal of the MATS rule in 2011, and a 
second following the proposal of the CPP in 2014. 
Collectively, the reports encompass views across the political 
spectrum and exhibit the perspectives of organizations with public 
and private interests. Among private business interests, the views of 
the Edison Electric Institute (“EEI”), an electric utility trade 
association, are representative. Although hedged in significant 
 
 123. For example, see infra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 124. For an up-to-date interactive database of state renewable portfolio standards and 
other state policies favoring renewables, see Database of State Incentives for Renewables & 
Efficiency, DSIRE, www.dsireusa.org [https://perma.cc/NK3T-2AM2]. 
 125. See, e.g., Alison Cassady, Complex Market Forces Are Challenging Appalachian 
Coal Mining, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.americanprogress.org
/issues/green/report/2014/10/06/98371/complex-market-forces-are-challenging-appalachian-coal-
mining/ [https://perma.cc/37U9-2N3E]; David Schlissel, Opinion, Coal Will Not Recover, 
PITT. POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 23, 2016, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-
Ed/2016/10/23/Coal-will-not-recover/stories/201610110033 [https://perma.cc/2VHD-4VVL]. 
 126. The remainder of this Section discusses, and cites, several of these studies. Even 
before EPA’s proposed GHG rules, analyses of the effects of the preceding rules were 
numerous enough to prompt Susan Tierney of World Resources Institute to describe 
keeping track of the studies as “a full time job” and to prepare a “field guide” to the 
studies. Susan Tierney, Electric Reliability Under New EPA Power Plant Regulations: A 
Field Guide, WORLD RES. INST. (Jan. 18, 2011), http://www.wri.org/blog/2011/01/electric-
reliability-under-new-epa-power-plant-regulations-field-guide [https://perma.cc/3ZHA-QFJD]. 
 127. See, e.g., Nicolas Loris, Obama’s War on Coal Is Driving Up Energy Costs, DAILY 
SIGNAL (Mar. 23, 2016), http://dailysignal.com/2016/03/23/obamas-war-on-coal-is-driving-
up-energy-costs/ [https://perma.cc/E7D5-HSDB]. 
 128. EPA’s estimated compliance costs for each of these rules ran into the billions of 
dollars. See supra notes 105, 121 and accompanying text. 
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respects, EEI’s 2011 report invited the inference that EPA’s rules 
would jeopardize grid reliability based on projections that plant 
closures would greatly exceed EPA’s estimates.129 More recently, 
American Electric Power, a leading owner of coal plants nationally, 
has claimed that the CPP will jeopardize system reliability based on 
EPA’s own projections of the number and rate of plant closures.130 
Other industry commentary has been more regionally targeted but no 
less critical. For example, Southwestern Electric Power Company 
(“SWEPCO”) has argued that the CPP “assumes the retirement or 
reduced use of all coal- or lignite-fueled power plants serving 
SWEPCO’s 24/7 base load” in SWEPCO’s service area and 
consequently poses a critical threat to system reliability.131 
At the other end of the spectrum, public interest organizations 
and other private entities have actively supported EPA’s analyses or 
conducted their own favorable assessments. For example, a 2012 
report issued by the Union of Concerned Scientists concluded that 
coal plant retirements were driven predominantly by market forces 
and that EPA rules would not jeopardize reliability given the excess 
generation capacity in the system.132 Likewise, a 2010 analysis of the 
CSAPR and MATS rules prepared for Exelon Corporation, the 
 
 129. See STEVEN FINE, SHANYN FITZGERALD & JESSE INGRAM, EDISON ELECTRIC 
INSTITUTE, POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION ON THE U.S. 
GENERATION FLEET: FINAL REPORT 11 (2011), http://www.pacificorp.com/content/dam
/pacificorp/doc/Energy_Sources/Integrated_Resource_Plan/2011IRP/EEIModelingReportFinal
-28January2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJ5A-GZ6X]. For criticism of the methods used in the 
EEI report, see generally SUSAN F. TIERNEY & CHARLES CICCHETTI, THE ANALYSIS 
GROUP, THE RESULTS IN CONTEXT: A PEER REVIEW OF EEI’S “POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF 




 130. See AEP’s View of EPA’s Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, AEP ACTION 
NETWORK, https://www.aepadvocacy.com/issues.aspx?ArticleID=Article1 [https://perma.cc
/UWK6-8U48]. 
 131. See Lou Antonelli, Proposed EPA Regs Would Close Welsh Plant, DAILY TRIB. 
(Sept. 12, 2014, 6:54 PM), http://www.dailytribune.net/news/proposed-epa-regs-would-
close-welsh-plant/article_2457d790-3ad8-11e4-960b-1714cb5d703b.html [https://perma.cc
/S48R-9R84] (quoting Brian Bond, vice-president of external affairs for SWEPCO). 
 132. RACHEL CLEETUS ET AL., UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, RIPE FOR 
RETIREMENT: THE CASE FOR CLOSING AMERICA’S COSTLIEST COAL PLANTS 3 (2012), http:
//www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/clean_energy/Ripe-for-Retirement-
Full-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9W54-B6VC]. The Bipartisan Policy Center reached 
similar conclusions in a 2011 report. JENNIFER MACEDONIA ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION AND ELECTRIC SYSTEM RELIABILITY 3 (2011), http://bipartisanpolicy.org
/library/environmental-regulation-and-electric-system-reliability/ [https://perma.cc/7P9V-
TH2T] (finding little risk to reliability because of market adaptations and the fact that 
retiring plants have low capacity factors). 
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largest merchant seller of electricity from nuclear power plants, 
concluded that coal plant retirements would lag planned capacity 
additions and that electricity grids were protected regionally by excess 
capacity that was more than sufficient to safeguard reliability.133 
Analyses and commentary of those with economic or ideological 
biases134 can be distinguished from comments submitted by 
organizations with direct responsibility for ensuring the reliability of 
the electric system. That latter set of comments is more varied and 
difficult to summarize, in part because the regulatory landscape itself 
is complex. The law divides responsibility for grid management 
among three types of entities: (1) electric reliability organizations, 
which are charged with ensuring system reliability and security 
pursuant to the Energy Policy Act of 2005;135 (2) Independent System 
Operators (“ISOs”)136 and Regional Transmission Organizations 
(“RTOs”),137 which are nonprofit associations of electric utilities that 
manage wholesale power and transmission markets;138 and (3) state 
 
 133. IRA SHAVEL & BARCLAY GIBBS, CHARLES RIVER ASSOCIATES, A RELIABILITY 
ASSESSMENT OF EPA’S PROPOSED TRANSPORT RULE AND FORTHCOMING UTILITY 
MACT 3–4 (2010), http://blog.cleanenergy.org/files/2011/09/cra-reliability-assessment-of-
epas-proposed-transport-rule.pdf [https://perma.cc/GHK9-7GL9]. The Bipartisan Policy 
Center reached similar conclusions. MACEDONIA ET AL., supra note 132, at 3. 
 134. A recent analysis of corporate speech by James Coleman has revealed that 
companies’ warnings about the costs of environmental rules ought to be taken with a grain 
of salt. Coleman showed that when speaking to investors about a proposed EPA rule, 
companies paint a far more optimistic picture of their ability to absorb compliance costs 
than when speaking to regulators. See James W. Coleman, How Cheap Is Corporate Talk? 
Comparing Companies’ Comments on Regulations with Their Securities Disclosures, 40 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 47, 70–71 (2016). 
 135. 16 U.S.C. §	824o (2012). 
 136. FERC’s Order 888 encouraged utilities to join together to form ISOs to manage 
the grid and the geographically broader markets that accompanied the move to 
competition in wholesale electricity markets. See Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale 
Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public 
Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 
Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,591–97 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385). 
Transmission owners retain ownership of their lines upon joining the ISO but relinquish 
control over pricing and scheduling of transmission services to the ISO. Id. 
 137. FERC’s Order 2000 established the parameters for creating regional transmission 
organizations. See Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 
810, 810 (Jan. 6, 2000) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). RTOs operate similarly to ISOs, and 
FERC originally hoped that RTOs would be much broader geographically. Id. at 861–64. 
However, this Article uses the terms RTO and ISO interchangeably. 
 138. In most places where there is no RTO to manage wholesale markets, investor-
owned utilities (“IOUs”) remain vertically integrated and traditionally regulated. In these 
places there tend to be fewer third-party wholesale transactions, and IOUs manage 
reliability collectively through informal power pools. See generally Paul L. Joskow, 
Transmission Policy in the United States, 13 UTIL. POL’Y 95 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center 
for Regulatory Studies) (2005) (describing how vertically integrated utilities manage 
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public utility commissions (“PUCs”), which oversee retail electricity 
service and manage the siting of generation and transmission facilities 
within their states, among other things.139 In addition, the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) oversees wholesale power 
and interstate transmission markets by working with grid operators 
and other entities to promote reliability.140 These organizations’ 
analyses of the EPA rules are described in this Part, before turning to 
a broader evaluation of their effects in Part III. 
A. Federal Regulators: FERC and NERC 
FERC has primary responsibility for setting standards and 
ensuring grid reliability at the federal level, but it exercises this 
authority indirectly through other entities. Under the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005, FERC is required to designate one or more electric 
reliability organizations to enforce electric reliability standards.141 In 
2006, FERC designated the North American Electric Reliability 
Corporation (“NERC”),142 a nonprofit organization created in 1968 
following the massive blackout of the eastern seaboard earlier in that 
decade.143 While the U.S. electric grid has been described as the 
world’s largest machine,144 it is in fact three grids: the Eastern 
Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the Electric 
 
supply and demand of power in their control areas in the absence of RTOs). During the 
1990s, a sizable minority of states also opted to restructure their retail electricity markets, 
mandating the unbundling of electricity sales from distribution services, opening up retail 
sales to competition, and authorizing market pricing. These markets tend to be found in 
the northeastern and midwestern United States, as well as in Texas and California. 
 139. The Federal Power Act recognizes state authority over retail rates and the siting 
of generation facilities. 16 U.S.C. §	824(a) (2012). 
 140. FERC has jurisdiction over the rates charged for wholesale power and 
transmission services, id. §	824(b), and to ensure that rates are just, reasonable, and 
nondiscriminatory, id. §	824d(a)–(b). FERC sometimes uses its power over “practices 
affecting” rates to encourage investment in generating and transmission capacity. See 
generally Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(holding that the Federal Power Act authorizes FERC to regulate pricing of capacity 
markets as practices affecting wholesale rates). 
 141. §	824o. 
 142. Order Certifying North American Electric Reliability Corporation as the Electric 
Reliability Organization and Ordering Compliance Filing, 116 FERC ¶	61,062, para. 3 
(July 20, 2006). 
 143. History of NERC, N. AM. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORP. (Dec. 2012), http://
www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/Documents/History_Dec12.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RTY-2XK3]. 
 144. See PHILLIP F. SCHEWE, THE GRID: A JOURNEY THROUGH THE HEART OF OUR 
ELECTRIFIED WORLD 1 (2007) (“Taken in its entirety, the grid is a machine, the most 
complex machine ever made.”). 
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Reliability Council of Texas (“ERCOT”).145 For electric reliability 
planning purposes, NERC has divided these grids into subregions.146 
Conditional on FERC approval,147 NERC establishes a “reference” 
target level of energy generating capacity reserves referred to as a 
“reserve margin,”148 but due to heterogeneity in power generation 
sources and other grid characteristics, each NERC subregion has 
discretion to refine its reserve margins consistent with local 
conditions.149 
As the lead regulators nationally, NERC and FERC have been 
cautious in their critiques of the EPA rules. In 2011, NERC analyzed 
the effects on system reliability of several rules, including the CSAPR 
and MATS. The resulting report concluded “bulk power system 
reliability could be affected” in certain subregions if EPA did not 
allow sufficient time for construction of new capacity to replace 
retiring coal plants.150 NERC qualified its conclusions, however, 
noting that it was too early to project accurately the “exact impacts” 
of the regulations and acknowledging that EPA could mitigate 
potential threats to reliability by allowing deadlines to be adjusted.151 
When state regulators, ISOs/RTOs, and other entities expressed 
concerns about the effects of the MATS rule (and to a lesser extent 
 
 145. Energy in Brief: What is the Electric Power Grid and What Are Some Challenges it 
Faces?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief
/article/power_grid.cfm [https://perma.cc/NX98-DD9M]; History, ERCOT, http://www.ercot
.com/about/profile/history [https://perma.cc/F42H-JBYP]. 
 146. These regions correspond (roughly, if not precisely) with ISO/RTO regions, see 
infra Section II.B, except in regions not covered by an ISO or RTO. For a map and 
descriptions of NERC regions, see Regional Entities, N. AM. ELECTRIC RELIABILITY 
CORP., http://www.nerc.com/AboutNERC/keyplayers/Pages/Regional-Entities.aspx [https://
perma.cc/6RSU-CJ8P]. 
 147. 16 U.S.C. §	824o(b)(1) (2012). 
 148. For a description of NERC reserve margins, see M-1 Reserve Margin, N. AM. 
ELECTRIC RELIABILITY CORP., http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ri/Pages/PlanningReserveMargin
.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZQA6-ZRSH]. 
 149. NERC’s Reference Reserve Margin is equivalent to the Target Reserve Margin 
Level provided by each region or subregion’s own specific margin based on “load, 
generation, and transmission characteristics as well as regulatory requirements.” See N. 
AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 2014 SUMMER RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT app. II at 34 
(2014), http://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/2014SRA
.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3US-SHVX]. In 2014, if not provided, NERC assigned 15% 
Reserve Margin for predominately thermal systems and 10% for predominately hydro 
systems. Id. 
 150. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF FUTURE 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS, EXTRACTED FROM THE 2011 LONG-TERM 
RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 116–19 (2011), http://www.nerc.com/files/epa%20section.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YLD3-8GJQ].  
 151. Id. at 116, 120. 
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CSAPR) on system reliability,152 NERC responded by identifying 
measures for mitigating potential problems. NERC also took the 
opportunity, unusual at the time, to explain how it would advise EPA 
regarding waivers from MATS rule deadlines for coal plants it 
deemed necessary to maintaining grid reliability.153 
More recently, NERC released an “initial reliability review” of 
the CPP that adopts a similarly qualified tone, noting at the outset 
that “detailed and thorough analysis will be required” to accurately 
assess the feasibility of the plan.154 This observation did not prevent 
NERC from raising substantial concerns. Among other issues, NERC 
suggested that EPA’s estimates of the power generation capacity lost 
to plant retirements “may be conservative,” and that replacing it 
without jeopardizing reliability “may” be challenging.155 NERC also 
took issue with the first and second building blocks identified in the 
CPP, raising particular concerns about the viability of significant 
efficiency gains in the power sector156 and relying on increased 
operation of natural gas-fired units to offset the lost capacity from 
coal plant retirements.157 While NERC’s analysis stops short of 
declaring that the CPP will impair reliability, it urges EPA to include 
a provision for regulatory waivers much like it did for the MATS 
 
 152. See, e.g., FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, MIDWEST INDEPENDENT TRANSMISSION 
SYSTEM OPERATOR, INC.’S RESPONSES TO REQUEST FOR EVIDENCE OF COMMISSIONER 
PHILLIP D. MOELLER ON EPA ISSUES FOR THE NOVEMBER 2011 RELIABILITY 
CONFERENCE 2 (2011), https://www.misoenergy.org/Library/Repository/Tariff/FERC
%20Filings/Resp.%20Evidentiary%20Requests_AD12-1-000.pdf [https://perma.cc/9SR5-
MZB8] (alleging a reliability problem caused by the MATS rule). 
 153. See Policy Statement on the Commission’s Role Regarding the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, 139 FERC ¶	61,131, paras. 1–23 
(May 17, 2012). 
 154. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., POTENTIAL RELIABILITY IMPACTS OF EPA’S 
PROPOSED CLEAN POWER PLAN: INITIAL RELIABILITY REVIEW 1 (2014), http://www
.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/Potential_Reliability_Impacts_of
_EPA_Proposed_CPP_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2R9-9JDD]. 
 155. Id. at 2. 
 156. Id. at 8. The first building block on which EPA established state emission budgets, 
and on which EPA will judge state compliance plans, initially called for improving the heat 
rate at existing coal-fired units by 6%. Proposed Clean Power Plan, supra note 114, at 
34,855–62. This was adjusted to 2.1% to 4.3% in the final rule. Clean Power Plan, supra 
note 115, at 64,744. “Heat rate” refers to the amount of energy required to produce a unit 
of electricity (e.g., btus per kWh). Lowering the heat rate represents improved efficiency. 
 157. The second building block contemplates “re-dispatch” of cleaner, combined cycle 
natural gas-fired plants in lieu of coal-fired plants. Proposed Clean Power Plan, supra note 
114, at 34,862–66. NERC expresses doubt that coal-fired plants can improve their 
combustion efficiency to the degree that EPA does, and it contends that natural gas-fired 
plants are ill-suited to operating at the levels EPA contemplates in the rule. N. AM. ELEC. 
RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 154, at 9. 
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rule.158 EPA apparently heeded that warning, including a so-called 
“reliability safety valve” waiver option for plants shown to be critical 
to maintaining system reliability.159 
The responses of the FERC commissioners to the CPP roughly 
track their respective political affiliations. All five FERC 
commissioners addressed the effects of the CPP in 2014 testimony 
before Congress. Then-acting Chairman LeFleur, a Democrat,160 was 
circumspect, urging a greater role for FERC and state energy 
regulators in the development and implementation of the plan, but 
she declined to comment about whether the rule would jeopardize 
grid reliability.161 Commissioner Norris, another Democrat who left 
FERC in August of 2014,162 was supportive of the EPA rule and 
expressed optimism that FERC could work with EPA to manage the 
“challenging” transition to a lower-carbon fuel mix.163 Democrat 
Commissioner (now Chairman) Bay’s164 testimony was perfunctory 
but indicated a willingness to work with EPA and other regulators to 
implement the CPP.165 By contrast, the two Republican 
commissioners expressed much more skepticism.166 Commissioner 
 
 158. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 154, at 22 (suggesting “a set of 
reliability assurance provisions that may include a reliability backstop”). 
 159. See Clean Power Plan, supra note 115, at 64,671. 
 160. See Commissioner Bay Assumes FERC Chairmanship, HYDROWORLD.COM 
(Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.hydroworld.com/articles/2015/04/commissioner-bay-assumes-
ferc-chairmanship.html [https://perma.cc/LBG7-HXBY] (describing LaFleur’s political 
affiliation). 
 161. See FERC Perspectives: Questions Concerning EPA’s Proposed Clean Power Plan 
and Other Grid Reliability Challenges: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and 
Power of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong. 15–16 (2014) [hereinafter 
FERC Perspectives] (written statement of Cheryl A. LaFleur, Acting Chairman, Fed. 
Energy Regulatory Comm’n). 
 162. Ros Krasny, U.S. FERC Commissioner John Norris to Leave Energy Regulator, 
REUTERS (Aug. 7, 2014, 6:04 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-ferc-norris-
idUSKBN0G72H020140807 [https://perma.cc/8MPB-T38R] (describing Norris’s political 
affiliation). 
 163. See FERC Perspectives, supra note 161, at 33–34 (written statement of John 
Norris, Comm’r, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n). 
 164. Commissioner Bay Assumes FERC Chairmanship, supra note 160 (describing 
Bay’s political affiliation). 
 165. See FERC Perspectives, supra note 161, at 47–48 (written statement of Norman C. 
Bay, Comm’r, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n). At the time of his testimony, Norman 
Bay had not yet been sworn in as FERC commissioner but had been confirmed by the 
Senate. Id. at 47. 
 166. The Federal Power Act requires that no more than three of the five 
commissioners be from the same political party. 16 U.S.C. §	792 (2012). Phillip Moeller 
was originally appointed to FERC by President George W. Bush and was subsequently 
reappointed by President Obama. Commissioner Tony Clark is a Republican appointed by 
President Obama. Both men have since left FERC. See Commissioner Moeller to Leave 
FERC at End of October, HYDROWORLD.COM (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.hydroworld.com
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Moeller asserted that “EPA is creating national electricity policy” 
that reorients grid management from its traditional focus on 
economic dispatching to one based on “environmental dispatch”167 
and expressed concerns about reliability that mirrored those 
highlighted in the NERC report.168 Commissioner Clark’s testimony 
amplified Moeller’s views by accusing EPA of seeking to “reorder the 
jurisdictional relationship” between federal energy and 
environmental regulators.169 
Thus, although neither FERC nor NERC has directly opposed 
the EPA rules, officials in both entities raise significant concerns 
about potential threats to grid reliability and express substantial 
reservations about the proposed regulations. 
B. Regional Regulators: ISOs, RTOs, and NERC Regions 
ISOs and RTOs are the independent entities charged by FERC 
with managing wholesale power markets and regional transmission 
services. ISOs/RTOs exist in seven planning regions that cover most 
of the United States. Figure 2 summarizes the geographic reach of the 
existing ISOs/RTOs as well as two large areas (the non-RTO West 
and the non-RTO Southeast), both dominated by traditionally 







/QZU7-UAC8]; Michael Harris, FERC Commissioner Tony Clark Stepping Down Mid-
September, HYDROWORLD.COM (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.hydroworld.com/articles/2016
/08/ferc-commissioner-tony-clark-stepping-down-mid-september.html [https://perma.cc/Q9KR-
39ZU]. 
 167. See FERC Perspectives, supra note 161, at 20–22 (written statement of Philip D. 
Moeller, Comm’r, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n). Since his testimony before 
Congress, Commissioner Moeller has become more outspoken about his reliability 
concerns. In a letter to EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy, Moeller expressed concern 
about (1) the impacts of state-level pollution budgets and planning on national grid 
management; (2) the high costs of compliance with the plan; and (3) the technical barriers 
to complying with the “front loaded timeline” of the Clean Power Plan. See Letter from 
Phillip D. Moeller, Comm’r, FERC, to Gina McCarthy, Adm’r, EPA (Dec. 1, 2014), http://
www.eenews.net/assets/2014/12/02/document_pm_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8XY-ECKM]. 
 168. See FERC Perspectives, supra note 161, at 20–22 (written statement of Philip D. 
Moeller, Comm’r, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n). 
 169. See id. at 42–45 (written statement of Tony Clark, Comm’r, Fed. Energy 
Regulatory Comm’n). 
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Figure 2: ISOs/RTOs Operating in the United States170 
 
 
At the same time, NERC has designated regional entities 
charged with managing grid stability.171 Unlike ISOs/RTOs, NERC 
regions do not manage wholesale markets; rather, they are 
responsible for ensuring the reliability of the electric grid. The 
boundaries of NERC regional entities roughly track ISO/RTO 
boundaries where they exist; in the non-RTO areas, the Mountain 
West’s regional reliability entity is the Western Electric Coordinating 
Council (“WECC”), and in the Southeast that responsibility is shared 
by the Florida Reliability Coordinating Council (“FRCC,” managing 
the Florida grid) and the SERC Reliability Corporation (“SERC,” 
overseeing most of the rest of the Southeast).172 
 
 170. Figure 2 was created by the authors and adapted from FERC’s map of RTOs, 
which is available at FERC’s website. Regional Transmission Organizations 
(RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, http://www
.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp [https://perma.cc/R2TS-6MGR] (last updated 
Oct. 20, 2016). 
 171. See Regional Entities, supra note 146. 
 172. Id. SERC covers some states that exist entirely outside of ISOs/RTOs (Alabama, 
Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and Tennessee) as well as portions of other states that 
are within ISOs/RTOs (Arkansas, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Texas, and Virginia). See SERC, SERC REGIONAL 
BOUNDARIES 2–3 (2009), https://www.serc1.org/docs/default-source/about-serc/landing-
page/serc-regional-boundaries.pdf?sfvrsn=6 [https://perma.cc/VSM8-7NYV].  
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The regulatory authority of ISOs/RTOs derives from FERC’s 
statutory authority, and like FERC, their principal mandates are 
ensuring that wholesale power and transmission prices are just and 
reasonable173 and that the grid remains in balance.174 Among other 
responsibilities, ISO/RTO oversight centers on facilitating investment 
in the maintenance and expansion of the grid to meet changing 
market conditions. They achieve this goal by using either or both of 
two mechanisms: (1) allowing wholesale electricity prices to float 
freely to encourage investment when prices are very high, which is the 
approach taken in the restructured ERCOT market175 or (2) creating 
a separate capacity market through which electric utilities are paid to 
construct new capacity, as is done in PJM Interconnection, the New 
England ISO (“ISO-NE”), and the New York ISO (“NYISO”).176 
This responsibility to facilitate investment in the grid is of particular 
relevance here because it gives ISOs and RTOs a large stake in 
maintaining grid stability and provides a critical perspective on system 
management at the regional level. 
 
 173. See 16 U.S.C. §	824d (2012). Indeed, it is this requirement that justifies the SCED 
rule. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 174. The electric grid must be maintained at a frequency of 60 Hz or else the grid can 
fail, resulting in outages. See JACK CASAZZA & FRANK DELEA, UNDERSTANDING 
ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS 47–48 (2d ed. 2010). Since electricity cannot be economically 
stored, grid operators must ensure that the amount of electricity being dispatched to the 
grid is roughly equal to the amount being taken off of the grid by consumers at any given 
moment. In the jargon of grid management, they must “balance loads.” Keeping the grid 
in balance requires scheduling ancillary services: reserves, spinning reserves, and 
regulation. “Reserves” refers to generating capacity that is currently unused but available 
to serve load. If that capacity is already running, allowing the operator to dispatch its 
electricity to the grid on very short notice, it is a “spinning reserve.” “Regulation” services 
are the very short-term grid management activities that maintain voltages at their proper 
level to ensure grid reliability. See Willett Kempton & Jasna Tomić, Vehicle-to-Grid 
Power Fundamentals: Calculating Capacity and Net Revenue, 144 J. POWER SOURCES 268, 
271 (2005). 
 175. See WILLIAM W. HOGAN, ON AN “ENERGY ONLY” ELECTRICITY MARKET 
DESIGN FOR RESOURCE ADEQUACY 34 (2005), http://www.ercot.com/content/meetings/ltstf
/keydocs/2007/0423/Hogan_Energy_Only1.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7KJ-QZLF]. This system 
attempts to address the inadequate incentives to invest in infrastructure resources such as 
generation capacity by addressing the imperfections in the market’s design. “The resulting 
‘energy only’ market [does] not remove the need for regulatory interventions, 
but	.	.	.	substantially change[s] the [nature] of those interventions.” See id. 
 176. For an overview of these capacity markets, see Electric Power Markets: New 
England (ISO-NE), FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N (Mar. 10, 2016), http://www.ferc.gov
/market-oversight/mkt-electric/new-england.asp [https://perma.cc/ZN53-TF8G]; Electric 
Power Markets: New York (NYISO), FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N (Mar. 10, 2016), http://
www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/new-york.asp [https://perma.cc/X7WQ-7H8J]; 
Electric Power Markets: PJM, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N (May 25, 2016), http://
www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/mkt-electric/pjm.asp [https://perma.cc/Q6RY-XEKN]. 
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Among regional grid managers, PJM and the Midcontinent ISO 
(“MISO”) have a heightened interest in the EPA rules because 
together they are home to about fifty-three percent of the nation’s 
coal-fired power plants.177 Both have submitted detailed and carefully 
considered comments on the EPA rules. In 2011, PJM analyzed the 
impact of the CSAPR and MATS rules within its region and 
concluded that, while the rules would hasten coal plant retirements, 
they would not jeopardize generation resource adequacy.178 Similar to 
NERC, PJM also stopped short of opposing the CPP by instead 
proposing changes it viewed as essential to ensuring the reliability of 
the grid.179 The most important of these changes is inclusion of the 
aforementioned reliability safety valve that would release a state from 
its compliance obligations in the event that grid reliability is seriously 
threatened.180 
MISO’s 2011 analysis of four EPA rules, including CSAPR and 
MATS, also raises substantial reliability questions. Among other 
findings, it projects that retirements of coal plants would necessitate 
extensive investment in transmission capacity that could increase 
electricity rates by as much as 7.6%.181 In support of its comments on 
the CPP, MISO prepared a preliminary analysis of the plan. It 
concluded that replacement of coal plants with gas-fired units would 
be the most cost-effective method of meeting the CPP’s emissions 
goals, but warned that building new gas-fired capacity within the 
proposed timetable would be difficult.182 Consistent with this finding, 
 
 177. See Adelman & Spence, infra note 208. 
 178. See PJM INTERCONNECTION, COAL CAPACITY AT RISK FOR RETIREMENT IN 
PJM: POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE FINALIZED EPA CROSS STATE AIR POLLUTION 
RULE AND PROPOSED NATIONAL EMISSIONS STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS AIR 
POLLUTANTS 32–33 (2011), http://pjm.com/~/media/documents/reports/20110826-coal-
capacity-at-risk-for-retirement.ashx [https://perma.cc/NYJ6-FQHD]. 
 179. See PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Carbon 
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generation 
Units 4–5 (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/other-fed-state
/20141201-epa-hq-oar-20130602-pjm-comments-epa-rule-111d.ashx [https://perma.cc/AP8N-
DBQF]. 
 180. See id. at 13–14 (“[T]he Final Rule should incorporate the ability	.	.	.	to suspend 
the implementation of a particular aspect of an accepted State Plan if necessary to address 
any adverse unforeseen reliability impacts that may arise prior to or during the compliance 
period.”). 
 181. MISO, EPA IMPACT ANALYSIS: IMPACTS FROM THE EPA REGULATIONS ON 
MISO 6, 10 (2011), https://www.misoenergy.org/Library/Repository/Study/MISO%20EPA
%20Impact%20Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/7838-84EC]. 
 182. MISO, ANALYSIS OF EPA’S PROPOSAL TO REDUCE CO2 EMISSIONS FROM 
EXISTING ELECTRIC GENERATING UNITS 3, 17 (2014), https://www.misoenergy
.org/Library/Repository/Communication%20Material/EPA%20Regulations/AnalysisofEPAs
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MISO’s comments to EPA are silent on the framework and goals of 
the proposed rule but urge a slower timetable for compliance to 
ensure system reliability.183 
In addition to their individual comments, regional managers 
submitted joint comments on the CPP through the ISO/RTO 
Council.184 The comments expressed optimism about grid 
management, conditional on EPA making certain changes to the rule 
to facilitate interstate and regional coordination.185 The council 
proposed revisions that it claims “will give EPA and the states the 
tools needed to avoid negative reliability impacts	.	.	.	by ensuring that 
appropriate state, multi-state, and/or regional reliability reviews occur 
at all relevant stages.”186 The proposed revisions also included a 
reliability safety valve.187 Thus, similar to the comments from national 
regulators, the ISO/RTO Council strikes a balance between caution 
about ensuring grid reliability and optimism about the options 
available to mitigate such risks within the CPP framework. 
This optimism is not universal among ISOs/RTOs, however, and 
skepticism is particularly strong with respect to the CPP. For 
example, the Southwest Power Pool (“SPP”) issued an analysis in 
2011 of several EPA rules, including MATS, finding that while 
unlikely, EPA’s rules could significantly impact reliability “if larger 
generators are shut down or have significantly curtailed 
generation.”188 ERCOT has expressed fewer reservations about the 




 183. MISO, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Carbon Pollution Emission 




 184. The Council includes all seven American ISOs/RTOs, as well as two Canadian 
members that did not sign on to the Council’s comments on the Clean Power Plan. 
ISO/RTO Council, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Carbon Pollution Emission 
Guidelines For Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generation Units 1 (Dec. 1, 
2014), http://www.pjm.com/~/media/documents/other-fed-state/20141201-epa-hq-oar-20130602-
irc-comments.ashx [https://perma.cc/2HKV-K9X9]. 
 185. See id. at 2–3. 
 186. Id. at 3. 
 187. Id. at 2. 
 188. SOUTHWEST POWER POOL, CONCERNS IN LIGHT OF EXPECTED EPA 
REGULATIONS 3 (2011), https://www.spp.org/documents/16152/20111213%20eswg%20epa
%20reg%20concerns%20-%20endorsed.doc [https://perma.cc/3XEN-5QCS (staff-uploaded 
archive)]. 
 189. ERCOT projects that compliance costs for the MATS rule will represent about 
$0.75 per MWh, or less than one-tenth of one cent per kWh. See ERCOT, IMPACTS OF 
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with CSAPR.190 Both organizations have raised much graver concerns 
about the CPP. In a recent analysis, SPP warns that the CPP could 
cause “extreme” electricity shortages and “violations of NERC 
reliability standards” if coal plant retirements in its region occur prior 
to deployment of necessary infrastructure improvements.191 ERCOT’s 
analysis goes even further, arguing that more coal plants will retire 
than EPA projects and that the CPP will threaten reliability “in and 
around major urban centers, and will strain ERCOT’s ability to 
integrate new intermittent renewable generation resources.”192 
C. State Regulators 
The MATS rule and the CPP have also generated substantial 
comment from state public utilities commissions. Consistent with the 
intuition that those who object to proposed rules are more likely to 
comment than those who support them,193 most of the PUC comments 
were critical. Six state commissions commented on the MATS rule, 
and most of them were unequivocally negative.194 The Public Utility 
Commission of Texas, for example, contended that EPA’s MATS 
rule fails to address the impacts on grid reliability,195 while the Indiana 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS IN THE ERCOT REGION 4 (2014), http://www.ercot.com
/content/news/presentations/2014/Impacts%20of%20Environmental%20Regulations%20in
%20the%20ERCOT%20Region.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFN4-WMWH]. 
 190. ERCOT projects compliance costs with CSAPR to be as high as $7.75 per MWh. 
Id. at i–ii. Regional haze rules are also projected to have significant impacts within 
ERCOT. Id. 
 191. Southwest Power Pool, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Carbon Pollution 
Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generation Units 4 
(Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.spp.org/publications/2014-10-09_SPP%20Comments_EPA-HQ-
OAR-2013-0602.pdf [https://perma.cc/D863-HLDQ]. 
 192. ERCOT, ERCOT ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN 1 
(2014), http://www.ercot.com/content/news/presentations/2014/ERCOTAnalysis-
ImpactsCleanPowerPlan.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UNT-KKVQ]. 
 193. For a discussion of loss and risk aversion, see infra notes 307–08 and 
accompanying text. 
 194. The commenting state commissions were from Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, and Texas. See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for 
Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www
.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=50&so=ASC&sb=commentDueDate&po=0&s=state%
2Bcommission&dct=PS&D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234&docst=Government+State [https://
perma.cc/RL5W-GQW2 (staff-uploaded archive)] (filtering comments to include submissions 
by state government entities). 
 195. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for National 
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric 
Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired 
Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-
Institutional Steam Generating Units 2 (Aug. 4, 2011), https://www.regulations
.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-18538&attachmentNumber
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Utility Regulatory Commission warned that the rule would cause 
“massive	.	.	.	rate increases.”196 By comparison, the comments from 
the commission in Oregon were relatively benign, with Oregon only 
seeking a special exemption for a particular plant.197 The comments 
on the CPP are more numerous and critical: twenty-six state 
commissions submitted comments, many of which are modestly or 
strongly negative.198 Some, like the Florida Public Service 
Commission, questioned the legality of EPA’s proposal.199 Others, 
like the Georgia commission, challenged the fairness of the methods 
EPA used to derive the emissions budgets for each state.200 And most 
of the state commissions alleged that the CPP would impair electricity 




 196. Ind. Util. Regulatory Comm’n, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for National 
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric 
Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired 
Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-
Institutional Steam Generating Units 2 (Aug. 2, 2011), https://www.regulations
.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-19212&attachmentNumber
=2&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/KJB2-Q885 (staff-uploaded 
archive)]. 
 197. Or. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for National 
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric 
Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired 
Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-
Institutional Steam Generating Units 1–2 (Aug. 2, 2011), https://www.regulations
.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0234-18019&attachmentNumber=2
&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/9YQQ-EHSF (staff-uploaded 
archive)]. 
 198. For a full list of commenting state PUCs, see Standards of Performance for 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 
REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=50&so=ASC&sb
=organization&po=200&dct=PS&D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602&docst=Government+State 
[https://perma.cc/K7CV-ZGGA (staff-uploaded archive)] (filtering comments to include 
submissions by state government entities). 
 199. See, e.g., Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Carbon 
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units 5 
(Dec. 1, 2014), http://www.floridapsc.com/Files/PDF/Dockets/Federal/Comments_EPA
_12_1_2014.pdf#search=HQ-OAR-2013-0602 [https://perma.cc/V698-B7W9]. 
 200. See, e.g., Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Carbon 
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating 
Units 14 (June 18, 2014), http://www.psc.state.ga.us/GetNewsRecordAttachment.aspx?ID
=497 [https://perma.cc/5NV9-F3XB]. 
 201. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Carbon 
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Emissions from Existing 
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units 15–34 (Dec. 1, 2014), http://www
.puc.texas.gov/agency/topic_files/PUCT_Comments.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SBC-8J7W]. 
 202. N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for Carbon 
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Emissions from Existing 
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commissions were especially critical on this point, asserting that the 
CPP posed a major threat to the reliability of the electric grids in their 
regions. 
In sum, many (but not all) of the federal, regional, and state 
regulators responsible for maintaining the reliability of electricity 
markets have objected to one or more of EPA’s rules aimed at 
controlling emissions from coal-fired power plants. Among their 
objections are claims that the rules would force the closure of existing 
coal-fired plants, thereby jeopardizing the reliability of the electric 
system. Although their comments vary substantially in tone, the 
overarching message that emerges is of significant, technically 
grounded anxiety about the potential impacts of EPA’s rules on the 
adequacy of electricity supplies and grid stability. Further, while a 
number of the comments identify straightforward measures to 
mitigate, if not eliminate, such risks, virtually all of them conclude 
that grid stability is a significant issue that is not satisfactorily 
addressed in the proposed rules. Thus, what is left are conflicting 
claims from regulators about these EPA rules: EPA’s claim that the 
rules’ benefits dwarf their costs, versus grid regulators’ claims that the 
rules are likely to jeopardize the reliability of electric service. We 
delve more deeply into this conflict in Part III. 
III.  THE COSTS, BENEFITS, AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EQUITY OF 
EPA’S REGULATIONS 
This Part examines the geographic variation in costs and benefits 
associated with these three EPA rules, with a few caveats. Assessing 
the impacts of EPA rules is challenging, in part, because the 
intersection of electric utility and environmental regulation is 
unusually complex. As noted in Part II, multiple regulators exercise 
overlapping jurisdiction, both geographical and in terms of subject 
matter, over the targeted power plants.203 Further, the environmental 
impacts of air emissions from electric utilities can span local, regional, 
 
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units 10–11 (Nov. 25, 2014), http://
www.psc.nd.gov/public/newsroom/2014/docs/11-25-14NR-
EPACarbonEmissionsComments.pdf [https://perma.cc/73GD-SNKU]. 
 203. Some ISOs/RTOs oversee wholesale markets covering multiple states, whereas 
others cover just a single state; at the same time, regulation of retail markets by public 
utility commissions is entirely intrastate. State regulation, in turn, falls into either of two 
distinct categories—regulated retail markets with vertically integrated utilities, or 
restructured markets based on competitive retail pricing of electricity generation. 
Environmental regulations, which are set at the federal level but implemented largely at 
the state level, are superimposed over these blended layers of electricity regulation, and 
incorporate a wide range of policy instruments. 
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and global scales. GHGs responsible for climate change and the 
major conventional pollutants emitted by power plants are each part 
of global cycles, but also have local and regional impacts to varying 
degrees. It is this complex intermeshing of regulations that has 
allowed mismatches to persist between competing claims about 
regulatory impacts. 
As described in Part II, when assessing the impacts of EPA 
regulations on grid management and reliability, commentators tend to 
focus on the regional level.204 Much of this work has focused on the 
potential for EPA regulations to impede ISO/RTO operators from 
reliably managing subgrid regions due to projected losses of power 
generation capacity and declines in reserve margins.205 While EPA 
considers these issues, its regulatory impact analyses (“RIAs”) for the 
CSAPR, MATS, and CPP regulations center on national costs and 
benefits.206 The resulting failure to engage in a debate at a common 
spatial scale has led to confusion and allowed the opposing camps to 
talk past each other. We hope to bridge these gaps and, in doing so, to 
highlight the value of examining regulatory impacts at multiple scales 
when environmental harms and regulation do not occur at a single 
spatial scale. 
This analysis allows the consideration of regional distributions of 
impacts that are obfuscated by regulatory analyses based on national 
averages. It also provides an antidote to the prevailing focus on 
national social welfare in RIAs, which is striking given the 
prominence of environmental justice concerns at the local level and 
the importance of debates about equity and fairness in global 
negotiations over national commitments to mitigate GHG 
emissions.207 Distributional concerns are salient at the local and global 
levels, but they are marginalized at spatial scales between these levels. 
A virtue of EPA’s clean air regulations for electric utilities is that 
their impacts are felt from the local to the global level; they thus 
provide an opportunity to bring together the divergent scales of 
distributional debates over environmental regulation. 
 
 204. See supra Part II. 
 205. See, e.g., PJM INTERCONNECTION, supra note 178, at 32–33. 
 206. See infra note 271 and accompanying text. 
 207. See, e.g., David E. Adelman, The Collective Origins of Toxic Air Pollution: 
Implications for Greenhouse Gas Trading and Toxic Hotspots, 88 IND. L. REV. 273, 279–81 
(2014) (outlining the origins and types of distributional concerns raised by environmental 
justice advocates); Nicholas Stern, What is the Economics of Climate Change?, 7 WORLD 
ECON. 1, 6, 8 (2006) (highlighting the importance of addressing distributional issues 
associated with the impacts of climate change and the costs of mitigating it). 
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Section A of this Part draws on a range of EPA and other data208 
to examine the geographic distribution of coal-fired power plants 
throughout the country; Section B explores the compliance costs and 
human-health benefits of the EPA regulations at the regional level. 
We find that (1) most of the generating plants projected to retire in 
response to the EPA rules are old plants, near the end of their useful 
lives, which pollute at higher rates, and (2) the plants projected to 
retire are typically spread across the country in rough proportion to 
each region’s reliance on coal-fired power. Section C focuses on the 
distribution of pollution reduction benefits; the EPA data reveal that 
the benefits of these rules tend to be concentrated in the regions 
experiencing the most plant retirements. 
A. The Geographic Distribution of U.S. Coal-Fired Electricity 
Generation 
As of 2012, the United States had 460 operational coal-fired 
power plants with a total generation capacity of 321 GW,209 but these 
plants are not evenly distributed around the country. Western and 
northeastern states each accounted for less than 10% of the electricity 
generated from coal despite together accounting for about 30% of the 
electricity generated nationally from all sources.210 Twenty states 
collectively accounted for 80% of the coal generation in 2010, but just 
eight of them (Texas, Indiana, Ohio, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, 
Missouri, Illinois, Kentucky) accounted for 50% of that generation.211 
 
 208. Most of the data originate from EPA’s Integrated Planning Model (“IPM”) 
datasets for the MATS rule and CSAPR—IPM 4.10—and the more recent IPM dataset for 
the CPP—IPM 5.13 & 5.15. Integrated Planning Model (IPM) Base Case v.4.10, U.S. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/integrated-planning-
model-ipm-base-case-v410 [https://perma.cc/Q4JU-6CL5] [hereinafter IPM 4.10] (last 
updated Aug. 15, 2016); Power Sector Modeling Platform v.5.13, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/power-sector-modeling-platform-
v513 [https://perma.cc/U3SQ-9PVB] [hereinafter IPM 5.13] (last updated Aug. 5, 2016); 
Power Sector Modeling Platform v.5.15, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov
/airmarkets/power-sector-modeling-platform-v515 [https://perma.cc/RL3E-6QHV] [hereinafter 
IPM 5.15] (last updated Aug. 15, 2016). Data was analyzed from the IPM 4.10, IPM 5.13, and 
IPM 5.15 Base Cases, which estimate baseline emissions levels in the absence of the 
regulation under review, as well as the datasets derived from EPA’s modeled emissions 
projections for each rule after it is implemented. For more information regarding the 
analysis of this data, see David E. Adelman & David B. Spence, EPA Dataset Analysis 
(2016) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
 209. IPM 4.10, supra note 208. In terms of individual units, collectively the U.S. fleet 
has 1,121 operational coal-fired boilers. Id. This number drops somewhat with the new 
EPA IPM 5.13 to 1,033 plants, and the total capacity drops to about 290 GW. IPM 5.13, 
supra note 208. 
 210. Adelman & Spence, supra note 208. 
 211. Id. 
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As this list suggests, most of the coal-fired generation capacity is 
located in the Midwest and South, with just three regions—MISO and 
PJM, each managed by RTO/ISOs, and the southeastern SERC 
grid—accounting for two-thirds of coal generation nationally.212 
The geographic concentration of coal generation raises the 
specter that EPA regulations will disproportionately impact certain 
regions and states, which could be compounded by plant 
characteristics (such as age and size) in the areas most reliant on coal. 
Table 2 below summarizes the percentage of national coal-fired 
power emissions for key pollutants from each of the six regions with 
the largest fleets of coal plants.213 
 
Table 2: Regional Coal Generation Capacity & Emissions in 2012214 
 
 Emissions Nationally (%) 
ISO/RTO Regions Capacity (%) SO2 NOx Mercury CO2 
ERCOT (n=42) 7.2 3.4 5.4 9.2 8.2 
MISO (n=399) 31.0 37.1 29.5 35.3 30.8 
PJM (n=253) 21.5 25.8 18.7 19.1 19.6 
SERC (n=207) 20.1 23.9 17.9 18.5 19.6 
SPP (n=44) 4.5 3.3 6.5 6.7 5 
WECC (n=111) 10.6 3 17.3 8.8 12.4 
Total (n=1,121) 95.0 96.5 95.3 97.6 95.6 
 
While the percentages of emissions are comparable to the 
relative generating capacities within each region, there are several 
examples of significant divergence. Most glaringly, mercury emissions 
in ERCOT are about 30% greater than the region’s share of 
generation capacity.215 There are lesser, but still significant, 
 
 212. These calculations are based on EPA’s IPM 5.13 Base Case dataset, which among 
other assumptions is premised on mercury rules being implemented and grid conditions 
projected for 2016. IPM 5.13, supra note 208. Coal plants also generate a substantial 
portion of the power in these regions—72% in MISO, 46% in PJM, and 38% in SERC. Id. 
 213. See infra Table 2. When interpreting the data, it is important to recognize that if 
emissions levels were the same throughout the six regions, the percentage of total power 
generation or (roughly) capacity in each region would be comparable to the corresponding 
percentages for each of the pollutants. The data are based on unit/boiler-level information 
for each coal-fired power plant; this additional level of data is needed because units within 
a power plant can have widely divergent operating characteristics. 
 214. Based on EPA IPM 4.10 Base Case data for 2012. See IPM 4.10, supra note 208. 
 215. The divergence is even greater relative to the amount of coal generation in 
ERCOT. Reliable power generation data are only available under EPA’s IPM 5.13 
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divergences for SO2 (MISO emissions are about 20% higher than its 
share of generation capacity) and NOx (emissions in SPP and WECC 
are about 40% and 60% higher, respectively). These results indicate 
that apart from the exceptions noted above, regional emissions rates 
roughly track regional reliance on coal-fired generation. 
Of course, the degree to which new regulations will impose 
additional costs on individual plants will depend in large part on each 
plant’s preexisting pollution control equipment. This ranges from 
state-of-the-art equipment controlling SO2 and mercury emissions at 
many plants to nonexistent equipment for CO2 emissions (given the 
absence of federal regulations until recently).216 Adoption rates of 
SO2 controls are similar across the regions, with two notable 
exceptions: (1) WECC, where state and regional haze regulations217 
have driven up adoption rates, and (2) SPP, where adoption rates are 
substantially lower.218 The prevalence of pollution controls in WECC 
 
database, but the earliest estimates from those data are for 2016, which is after several of 
the key environmental regulations are already in effect. Despite this, the IPM 5.13 Base 
Case data indicate that mercury emissions in ERCOT will be sixty percent greater than its 
share of electricity generation in 2016. See IPM 5.13, supra note 208. 
 216. The control technologies for emissions of SO2 and NOx are relatively 
straightforward, with two primary options available for each pollutant. In the case of SO2, 
the two most common technologies are wet and dry scrubbers, which remove 96% and 
92%, respectively, of the SO2 emitted by a coal generation plant. CSAPR RIA, supra note 
89, at 230. Dry Sorbent Injection is a less-common third alternative that is much less 
expensive, but it must be combined with either a fabric filter (“FF”) or electrostatic 
precipitator (“ESP”) that is typically used to remove particulate emissions. See id. For 
NOx emissions, two technologies exist with substantially different levels of effectiveness: 
(1) Selective Non-Catalytic Reduction (“SNCR”), which removes up to 40% of NOx 
emissions, and (2) Selective Catalytic Reduction (“SCR”), which removes about 90% of 
NOx emissions. Id. at 231. Control of mercury emissions is substantially more complicated 
because it involves a mix of control technologies and the effectiveness of a given control 
technology varies with different types of coal (bituminous, subbituminous, lignite). See 
U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CONTROL OF MERCURY EMISSIONS FROM COAL FIRED 
ELECTRIC UTILITY BOILERS: AN UPDATE 3, 5 (2005), https://www3.epa.gov/airtoxics
/utility/ord_whtpaper_hgcontroltech_oar-2002-0056-6141.pdf [https://perma.cc/97WG-498E]. 
A principal control technology for mercury is Activated Carbon Injection (“ACI”), which 
must be used in conjunction with some kind of particulate matter controls (either FF or 
ESP) and may be further enhanced when used with an SCR system. MATS RIA, supra 
note 106, at 2–9. 
 217. EPA’s regional haze rule aims to improve visibility in national parks and 
wilderness areas, and is part of EPA’s regulation of particulate matter under the Clean Air 
Act. See Regional Haze Regulations, 64 Fed. Reg. 35,714, 35,714–15 (July 1, 1999) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51). EPA revised its regional haze rules in 2012. See Regional 
Haze: Revisions, 77 Fed. Reg. 33,642, 33,643 (June 7, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 51–52). 
 218. All of the data discussed here were taken from EPA IPM 5.13 NEEDs database 
for the year 2010; the analysis excludes units that were not generating electricity in 2010 as 
well as several classes of plants. See IPM 5.13, supra note 208, at ch. 4-1 to -2. 
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illustrates the influence of overlapping regulatory standards, while 
experience in SPP highlights the effectiveness of fuel switching.219 
Adoption rates of mercury controls are lowest in ERCOT, SERC, 
and SPP; however, the absence of federal regulation for the oldest 
plants has permitted adoption rates for strict controls to remain low in 
every region. Finally, the eastern focus of prior EPA NOx regulations 
is evident in adoption rates of NOx controls, which decline as one 
moves from PJM in the East to SPP and WECC in the West. Thus, 
regional patterns of existing pollution controls suggest that (1) grid 
management regions in the east are less likely to be negatively impacted 
by CSAPR than those in the Midwest, and that (2) the MATS rule is 
likely to have greater impacts in ERCOT and SERC. 
To the extent that new pollution controls or other measures are 
required, the average age and size of a power plant will place limits 
on the costs that it can economically bear. By virtue of their shorter 
remaining lifetime, older plants have less time to amortize the costs of 
new pollution controls. Similarly, smaller plants rely on relatively low 
levels of generation to recoup the costs of pollution controls, and they 
do not benefit from potential economies of scale. Thus, older and 
smaller coal plants are at greater risk of being shut down because the 
range of regulatory costs that they can incur while still remaining 
economically viable is smaller. 
The United States has among the oldest fleets of coal-fired 
power plants globally; its age distribution lags that of countries such 
as Russia and Poland and is much older than those in either India or 
China.220 The EPA data reveal that older (and smaller) coal-fired 
plants are geographically concentrated in just a few regions. MISO, 
PJM, and SERC together account for about seventy-two percent of 
the nation’s pre-1980 coal generation capacity.221 Further, roughly 
two-thirds to three-quarters of the coal generation capacity in each 
region is derived from plants more than thirty-five years old.222 These 
statistics suggest that a significant potential exists for regional 
disparities in the number of plant closures associated with the EPA 
 
 219. Despite relatively low adoption rates, SO2 emissions in SPP are below the national 
average, which is likely attributable to greater reliance regionally on low-sulfur coal. Fuel 
choice has the opposite effect in ERCOT, which—despite having relatively high rates of 
adoption for mercury controls—has high emissions rates. This apparent inconsistency is 
driven by reliance on lignite coal, for which emissions controls are less effective. 
 220. FINKENRATH ET AL., supra note 55, at 34 (detailing that in India and China 
almost 40% and 70%, respectively, of coal plants were less than ten years old as of 2012). 
 221. Adelman & Spence, supra note 208. The numbers of pre-1980 plants in MISO and 
PJM are striking on their own—186 and 126, respectively. 
 222. Id. 
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rules. The seriousness of the risks to grid stability will hinge, however, 
on the contribution of older plants to actual electricity generation, as 
opposed to the levels of electricity generating capacity.223 
The geographic distribution of smaller coal-fired plants overlaps 
substantially with the older plants. More than three-quarters of the 
smallest units (0 to 50 MW) were located in the MISO and PJM 
regions in 2012;224 however, collectively these units account for only a 
few percent of the coal-based electricity generated in either region.225 
Among the next tier (50 to 100 MW), the MISO and PJM regions are 
home to seventy percent of the coal-fired units,226 but once again, 
these units account for a small share of coal-fired generation. Thus, 
because their generating capacities and levels are low, it is unlikely 
that retirements of smaller coal-fired units alone could pose a threat 
to grid stability in either MISO or PJM.227 
It is nevertheless important to recognize that older and smaller 
coal-fired plants typically emit air pollutants at relatively high rates. 
Coal plants that went online prior to 1960 have dramatically higher 
SO2 and NOx emissions, about 100% and 50% higher, respectively, 
than newer plants and substantially higher mercury emissions at 
about 25%.228 Coal plants constructed post-2000, by contrast, emit on 
average 50% lower quantities of SO2 and about 60% less NOx than 
 
 223. All of the data discussed here are based on the EPA IPM 4.10 Base Case data for 
2012. See IPM 4.10, supra note 208. 
 224. MISO and PJM account for 112 out of 145 units nationally. Within MISO, 69 coal 
boilers, with a mean size of just 19 MW, had a combined capacity of 1.37 GW in 2012; 
similarly, within PJM, 43 boilers had a mean size of 38 MW and a combined capacity of 
1.64 GW. Id. 
 225. In 2012, 1.5% in MISO and 1.5% in PJM. Id. 
 226. In MISO there were 73 boilers, and in PJM 41, each with aggregate capacities of 
5.4 GW and 3.03 GW, respectively; collectively they accounted for about 68% of the 
aggregate capacity of boilers in the range of 50 to 100 MW. SERC was a distant third with 
18 plants and an aggregate capacity that accounted for about 11% of the national total. Id. 
 227. The analysis is conducted at the regional level and, thus, cannot foreclose smaller-
scale impacts on grid stability at the subregional level. We are not alone in this respect, 
however, as other leading reports acknowledge the same types of limits in their analyses. 
See, e.g., METIN CELEBI, FRANK GRAVES & CHARLES RUSSELL, THE BRATTLE GRP., 
POTENTIAL COAL PLANT RETIREMENTS: 2012 UPDATE 7 (2012), http://www.brattle
.com/system/publications/pdfs/000/004/678/original/Potential_Coal_Plant_Retirements_-_2012
_Update.pdf?1378772119 [https://perma.cc/PJH9-4R7L] (acknowledging that retirements could 
cause problems for subregions heavily reliant on specific units); JURGEN WEISS ET AL., THE 
BRATTLE GRP., EPA’S CLEAN POWER PLAN AND RELIABILITY 29 (2015), http://
www.brattle.com/system/publications/pdfs/000/005/121/original/EPAs_Clean_Power_Plan_and
_Reliability_-_Assessing_NERC's_Initial_Reliability_Review.pdf?1427375637 [https://perma.cc
/W5RQ-3Y5W] (noting similar potential problems). 
 228. The discussion in this paragraph is based on the authors’ analysis of the EPA data. 
See Adelman & Spence, supra note 208. 
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the fleet averages. The higher annual emissions from the oldest coal 
units follows from their low adoption rates of emissions control 
technologies. Approximately 70% to 85% of the plants that went 
online prior to 1970 have no or weak controls for SO2, NOx, and 
mercury, compared with about 25% of plants brought online during 
the 1960s and 1980s and less than 15% otherwise.229 The low adoption 
rates of pollution controls are clearly evident in these statistics: older 
and particularly smaller plants have dramatically higher emission 
levels than newer and larger facilities. 
One expected association that was observed only weakly was the 
inverse correlation between age and efficiency of coal-fired power 
plants. Significant improvements in efficiency are evident in the units 
constructed after 1960, as well as the most recent post-2000 
generation of coal plants. Further, the variation in efficiency for the 
oldest units is much larger and extends to much lower levels of 
efficiency than those of plants constructed after 1960. However, only 
incremental gains were made in power plant efficiency during the 
intervening years, and average efficiency gains for coal-fired power 
plants were in the range of about 10% to 15% over the fifty-year 
period covered by the data.230 Perhaps in part because of this, there 
was relatively little variation in the annual operation rates (capacity 
factors) for coal plants irrespective of their age or size: slightly lower 
for 1990 to 2000 and slightly higher for 1940 to 1960 and 2000 to 
2015.231 
The overall impression these statistics leave of U.S. coal-fired 
power plants is quite mixed. The most consistent attribute of the U.S. 
fleet is its age—less than 10% of the generation capacity in 2012 was 
constructed in the prior two decades, and almost 70% of the units 
were more than thirty years old.232 There are also a large number of 
 
 229. The highest percentages of weak pollution controls were: 1940 to 1960 (45% 
capacity and 38% generation), 1960 to 1970 (23% capacity and 20% generation), and 1980 
to 1990 (25% capacity and 23% generation); weak pollution control percentages were less 
than 15% for other year categories. IPM 4.10, supra note 208; Adelman & Spence, supra 
note 208. 
 230. IPM 4.10, supra note 208. The median capacity factor for plants of widely varying 
ages is roughly 75% to 85%, with somewhat larger variances in capacity factors for plants 
that went online between 1980 and 2000. Id. 
 231. The one notable exception was the low capacity factors for small plants in certain 
regions, particularly 50 MW to 100 MW plants in PJM and 0 MW to 50 MW plants in 
SERC, and, to a lesser extent, 0 MW to 50 MW plants in MISO. These differences are also 
reflected in the generation data by size of plant. For older plants with None/SNCR/DSI 
controls, capacity factors are substantially lower for 1960 to 1980. If a plant has scrubber, 
which many do, capacity factors are consistently above 80%. Id. 
 232. Adelman & Spence, supra note 208. 
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coal-fired units (almost 209 in 2012) with capacities below 100 MW 
and disproportionately large emissions rates—although collectively 
their emissions are small relative to those from much larger, higher-
generating units. Yet, it is also true that from a global perspective the 
generation capacity of these smaller units—about 17 GW in 2012—is 
significant in comparison to grid capacities in many midsize countries; 
Chile had a total grid capacity of about 18 GW in 2014,233 and even 
larger developed countries such as Australia have total capacities of 
about 45 GW.234 
Another major pattern that emerges from the data is the 
geographic concentration of coal-fired power generation in 
midwestern and southeastern states, while many states in the West 
and Northeast have very little coal generation. Regions in the 
Midwest and Southeast have benefitted from inexpensive coal-fired 
generation (benefitting in part from regulatory grandfathering under 
the CAA) and have leveraged these assets by maximizing their 
operational life.235 Thus, while regions with the highest coal-fired 
power generation capacity may experience more plant closures than 
other regions, their losses will be mitigated by the fact that the plants 
most likely to be shut down typically will be less valuable and, in any 
event, fully amortized given their age and size. 
Finally, the preceding analysis shows that while the regions with 
the largest numbers of coal plants will have the greatest number 
threatened by EPA regulations, those regions will not face 
disproportionate generation losses; in short, while the numbers may 
appear large in absolute terms, they are modest when considered 
relative to regional generation capacity. This means that regional grid 
management can mitigate the potential impacts of EPA regulations 
by spreading the costs and risks over larger areas. 
B. Economic and Technical Drivers of Vulnerable Coal-Fired Power 
Plants 
The characteristics of a power plant and of its regional electricity 
market will ultimately determine whether a plant either shuts down 
 
 233. JUAN PABLO CARVALLO, PATRICIA HIDALGO-GONZALEZ & DANIEL M. 
KAMMEN, ENVISIONING A SUSTAINABLE CHILE 3 (2014), https://www.nrdc.org/sites
/default/files/envisioning-sustainable-chile-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/KUS6-J4L6]. 
 234. Generation Capacity and Peak Demand, AUSTL. ENERGY REGULATOR, https://
www.aer.gov.au/node/9772 [https://perma.cc/QC9Y-U3ES]. 
 235. See David B. Spence, Coal-Fired Power in a Restructured Electricity Market, 15 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 187, 195–96 (2005); JOYCE MCLAREN, NAT’L RENEWABLE 
ENERGY LAB., SOUTHEAST REGIONAL CLEAN ENERGY POLICY ANALYSIS 6–7, 79 
(2011), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy11osti/49192.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQ6H-YK3Y]. 
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or substantially reduces its annual output. In addition to the plant-
level data on heat rates, plant emissions levels, and pollution control 
equipment discussed above,236 the EPA database contains 
information on the costs of pollution control equipment; variable and 
fixed operations; and maintenance, fuel, and capital investments.237 
This information is essential to evaluating the impacts of EPA’s rules 
and is an integral part of the regulatory impact analyses the agency 
conducts. Thus, for the CSAPR and MATS rules, there are direct 
EPA projections of retirements at the unit level.238 Table 3 displays 
the number, regional capacity, and median size and age of the plants 
that are projected to retire as a result of the CSAPR and MATS 
rules.239 As expected, the units projected to retire in response to the 
CSAPR are overwhelmingly older and smaller, with median ages 
typically of more than fifty years and sizes well under 100 MW. The 
MISO and SPP regions, which host many smaller, older plants lacking 
the relevant control technologies, are projected under EPA’s models 
to have substantial numbers of retirements. In these projections, it 
appears that the age of a unit is the single most important factor 
driving retirements, presumably because the costs of emissions 
control upgrades cannot be fully amortized over its remaining life. 
This pattern is also evident for the retirements in the PJM and SERC 
regions, where the median online year (original year of operation) of 
retired units is 1952 and 1953, respectively. In terms of grid reliability 
concerns, it is hard to see much of a threat posed by the CSAPR, 
since the total capacity at risk is just 6.6 GW, and the highest relative 
loss in any of the regions is only about 4% of coal-fired power 
generation capacity and 2% of total regional generation capacity.240 
 
 
 236. The EPA datasets IPM 4.10 and IPM 5.13 both contain this information. See supra 
note 208 and accompanying text. 
 237. Only the EPA IPM 5.13 dataset contains a complete set of plant-level cost 
information. See IPM 5.13, supra note 208. 
 238. The CSAPR data are based on the “retrofits SO2/NOx controls” variable in the 
CSAPR Remedy database. See IPM 4.10, supra note 208. For the MATS estimate, we 
used the IPM 5.13 Base Case data, see IPM 5.13, supra note 208, but removed the plants 
that were attributable to the CSAPR; the IPM 5.13 Base Case data start with the 
assumption that the MATS rule has been implemented, and since the MATS rule is very 
costly, it is reasonable to assume that most retirements will be attributable to it. These 
estimates are likely overinclusive and will thus err conservatively on the side of being too 
high. 
 239. Note that CSAPR covers a limited number of states and thus only four regions. 
See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 240. Adelman & Spence, supra note 208. As noted above, this analysis is conducted at 
the regional level and thus cannot foreclose smaller-scale impacts on grid stability at the 
subregional level. 
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MISO 13 904 70 1969 2 13.79 31.02 
PJM 26 3,087 94 1952 4 47.11 21.54 
SERC 23 2,214 106 1953 0 33.79 20.13 
SPP 6 348 54 1961 0 5.31 4.52 
All 
Regions 




















ERCOT 3 1,262 435 1978 1 2.92 7.21 
FRCC 4 1,236 304 1975 2 2.86 3.37 
ISO-NE 10 2,128 178 1966 2 4.92 0.84 
MISO 80 10,071 86 1961 4 23.30 31.02 
NYISO 15 1,561 84 1958 3 3.61 0.79 
PJM 32 5,627 145 1963 7 13.02 21.54 
SERC 82 15,629 135 1958 9 36.16 20.13 
SPP 8 1,948 140 1971 3 4.51 4.52 
WECC 17 3,759 51 1979 8 8.70 10.57 
All 
Regions 
251 43,221 140 1966 39 100.00 100.00 
 
The data suggest that the MATS rule has the potential to have a 
much greater impact on coal generation, and thus on grid stability; 
yet, here too there are mitigating factors and considerations. First, 
similar to the CSAPR, the coal-fired units projected to retire in 
response to the MATS rule are older and smaller, except in ERCOT 
and Florida,242 where the median size is larger and the median age 
younger. However, even in those two regions, the numbers of units 
projected to retire are small, representing a capacity of about one 
GW in each region. Second, a large number of units projected to 
retire date back to the 1960s or earlier—the data for MISO and 
SERC illustrate this correlation vividly. Third, the total capacity lost 
in any given region, whether in absolute or relative terms, is small.243 
 
 241. See IPM 4.10, supra note 208; IPM 5.13, supra note 208; Adelman & Spence, 
supra note 208; supra note 238. 
 242. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 243. Adelman & Spence, supra note 208. For example, while ISO-NE and NYISO 
experience large drops in coal generation, the losses represent only about 5% of total 
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Finally, it is not evident from the table, but SERC—the only region 
disproportionately244 impacted by the MATS rule—is in a strong 
position to absorb capacity lost due to retirements. In addition to 
having a fleet of coal plants nearing the end of their lifetimes 
(including the oldest one in the country), SERC has a reserve margin 
that amounts to an excess capacity above twenty-five percent.245 
As noted previously, estimating the number of retirements and 
their geographic distribution is much more challenging for the CPP 
because of the flexibility it gives states to employ measures other than 
reducing CO2 emissions from coal and gas plants. EPA and other 
commentators are limited to using “illustrative examples” to estimate 
the impacts on generation sources and grid reliability, as no one can 
be sure of the specific mix of policies that states will ultimately 
adopt.246 These uncertainties have not stopped independent analysts 
from projecting likely retirements at the regional level, and we too 
draw on the EPA data to make rough estimates ourselves. One must 
be especially careful, however, as any such estimates are necessarily 








capacity because coal is a minor generation source in those regions. Conversely, the 
regions with the largest capacity losses in absolute terms (MISO, SERC) have the highest 
power generation capacities, resulting in relative losses of about 8%. 
 244. Disproportionately impacted in this context means that a region’s share of 
projected retirements (based on capacity) significantly exceeds its share of total power 
generation. Note that the reserve margins in MISO are low relative to other regions 
(about 15%), but still above the NERC reference margin level. N. AM. ELEC. 
RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 149, at 2. Similar to SERC, the region with the third-
highest capacity losses from retirements, PJM, has high reserve margins in the range of 
25%. Id. 
 245. Adelman & Spence, supra note 208. SERC also has relatively low electricity 
prices, and is dominated by the traditional model of vertically integrated utilities earning a 
guaranteed return on their capital investments. 
 246. See CPP RIA, FINAL RULE, supra note 121, at ES-3. 
 247. The other point to keep in mind is that while the MATS rule primarily impacted 
coal plants, the CPP is projected to have significant impacts on gas plants, particularly 
older, less-efficient gas plants (so-called “oil/gas steamers”). According to EPA estimates, 
oil/gas steamers will account for about sixteen percent of the retirements associated with 
implementation of the CPP by 2030. These data come from the CPP Rate-Based SSR file 
in the IPM 5.13 dataset. See IPM 5.13, supra note 208. 
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ERCOT 7.80 291 1.36 600 2.29 
FRCC 2.90 570 2.66 1,407 5.36 
ISO-NE 0.04 2 0.01 2 0.01 
MISO 21.84 4,624 21.61 4,624 17.62 
NYISO 0.24 68 0.32 68 0.26 
PJM 22.89 6,590 30.79 7,640 29.12 
SERC 20.57 6,703 31.32 8,881 33.85 
SPP 10.24 1,259 5.88 1,719 6.55 
WECC 12.02 1,295 6.05 1,295 4.93 
U.S. Total 100 21,402 100 26,236 100 
 
EPA projections for retirements of coal plants resulting from the 
CPP are displayed in Table 4 above.249 The most striking feature of 
the data is the degree to which the retirements are proportional to 
regional generation levels. While the share of retirements in PJM and 
SERC is higher than those regions’ percentages of U.S. generation in 
2018, and the losses in ERCOT, SPP, and WECC are lower, these 
differences are relatively small. Moreover, each region experiencing 
retirements that exceed their share of annual generation has robust 
reserve margins in the range of 25% or higher, and the losses amount 
to 10% to 15% of each region’s total generation capacity.250 
Particularly given the complexity of the CPP and the range of factors 
EPA is balancing, the geographic distribution of retirements 
effectively mitigates potential problems with grid reliability. The only 
potential outlier is ERCOT, which has struggled to sustain a sufficient 
reserve margin,251 but, as the analysis shows, the initial concerns have 
 
 248. Id. 
 249. EPA does not provide separate estimates for retirements of coal and natural gas 
power plants at the regional level. However, EPA does not predict any net losses of power 
generation capacity nationally from either combined-cycle or combustion turbines fueled 
by natural gas. Id. Oil/gas steamers are the only power plants with significant retirements 
of generation capacity other than coal-fired power plants through 2030 under the CPP 
rate-based scenario. Id. 
 250. N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., supra note 149, at 2. 
 251. See SAMUEL A. NEWELL ET AL., THE BRATTLE GRP., ESTIMATING THE 
ECONOMICALLY OPTIMAL RESERVE MARGIN IN ERCOT 1 (2014), http://www.brattle.com
/system/publications/pdfs/000/004/978/original/Estimating_the_Economically_Optimal_Reserve
_Margin_in_ERCOT_Revised.pdf?1395159117 [https://perma.cc/LXH6-3ETS]. ERCOT’s 
market is the only wholesale market characterized by both retail competition and the 
absence of a capacity market, which means that prospective investors in new plants lack any 
sort of revenue guarantee. See SAMUEL NEWELL ET AL., THE BRATTLE GRP., ERCOT 
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been defused by the final CPP, which is projected to cause only about 
a 2.5% drop in coal-fired power generation capacity by 2030. 
To gain a rough sense of the coal plants that are most likely to 
retire as a result of the CPP, we modified unit-level data from EPA’s 
database to incorporate the costs of all anticipated emissions 
controls.252 Similar to other studies, such as those of the Brattle 
Group,253 we evaluated a series of cutoffs for electricity prices above 
which coal plants were presumed to be uneconomic. The cutoffs were 
set regionally and then adjusted to generate an aggregate capacity of 
coal plant retirements that was comparable to the lower end of the 
range derived by EPA for each region.254 Table 5 displays the regional 
distribution and key characteristics of the coal plants projected to 
retire. While there is substantial interregional variation, much of this 
is associated with a small number of plants in a few regions.255 Once 
again, most of the projected retirements involve older and smaller 
 




 252. We identified plants requiring emissions control equipment to meet the CSAPR 
and MATS that remained uncontrolled under EPA’s IPM 5.13 Base Case; in effect, this 
ensured that the cost of emissions controls were integrated into the generation costs of all 
coal-fired units in the database. The costs factored into the analysis included fixed 
operations and maintenance (“O&M”) costs, variable O&M costs, capital costs, and fuel 
costs. We were not able to use the IPM 5.15 used in the final rule for the CPP because the 
data released did not include parsed data; we do not expect this to materially affect our 
results. See IPM 5.13, supra note 208. 
 253. CELEBI ET AL., supra note 227, at 5–7 (using the cost of different pollution control 
retrofits to calculate the cost implications of proposed EPA rules and then setting 
aggregate cutoffs for costs to estimate the total generation capacity of coal plants that are 
likely to retire). The Brattle Group used a more complex methodology to assess the CPP 
in a more recent study that we do not attempt to replicate here. METIN CELEBI ET AL., 
THE BRATTLE GRP., EPA’S PROPOSED CLEAN POWER PLAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
STATES AND THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY 4–5 (2014), http://www.brattle.com/system
/publications/pdfs/000/005/025/original/EPA's_Proposed_Clean_Power_Plan_-_Implications
_for_States_and_the_Electric_Industry.pdf [https://perma.cc/GU3S-XUKS]. 
 254. EPA estimates that the CPP will cause 23 GW to 29 GW of additional coal-fired 
power generation capacity to retire by 2025. CPP RIA, FINAL RULE, supra note 121, at 3-
30. The regional cutoffs varied between $0.045 per kWh for the WECC region and $0.065 
per kWh for the FRCC region. If we had attempted to lower the cutoffs further, the 
estimates would begin to overlap substantially with the middle of the cost distribution, 
making the projections subject to far greater variances. 
 255. Our simple model for projected retirements reveals that in ERCOT and FRCC 
only a handful of larger coal-fired power plants are at risk (this is in part because the 
regions themselves are relatively small), which accounts for the larger average size of the 
at-risk plants for these regions displayed in Table 5. The patterns of projected retirements 
in SERC are more complicated; they turn largely on relatively higher operational costs 
and the large installed capacity of coal-fired power plants in the region. 
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coal-fired units, with 67% more than 35 years old and 65% of the 
units having capacities below 100 MW.256 By design, the results follow 
the regional patterns observed in the EPA projections for retirements 
of coal units, with the regions having the largest capacities 
experiencing the greatest losses.257 The results are, however, 
substantially lower than the results of other independent analyses, but 
those analyses were all based on EPA’s proposed rule, which was 
projected to have much higher coal plant retirements than the final 
rule258—both because EPA increased the number of coal plants 
projected to retire prior to the CPP going into effect and because 







 256. Adelman & Spence, supra note 208. 
 257. The analysis shows MISO bearing a larger burden of retirements than EPA 
projects; and we project WECC bearing a smaller share, particularly given that the EPA 
estimates include natural gas plants. These differences are undoubtedly reflective of the 
very simple framework that we are using, as well as the difficulty EPA acknowledges in 
making projections below the national level. We don’t expect our estimates to be precise, 
but instead to provide an indication of the general patterns with respect to unit size and 
age that are illustrative of the facilities likely to be at a greater risk of retirement. 
 258. EPA’s and our estimates of the net loss coal-fired power generation capacity are 
consistent with those found in several recent reports. See, e.g., ERCOT, supra note 192, at 
6 (projecting 4.1 GW of coal plant retirements in ERCOT from the CPP, which is about 
35% higher than our crude projection for ERCOT); U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS OF THE CLEAN POWER PLAN 17 (2015), http://www.eia.gov
/analysis/requests/powerplants/cleanplan/pdf/powerplant.pdf [https://perma.cc/5N9J-9ZEC] 
(estimating that the CPP will cause 50 GW coal-fired power generation capacity to be shut 
down nationally); WEISS ET AL., supra note 227, at 13 (describing SPP estimate that the 
CPP will cause about 6 GW of coal plant retirements in the SPP, which is about 30% 
higher than our estimate). 
 259. Compare CPP RIA, FINAL RULE, supra note 121, at 3-6 to -7, 3-27 (listing state 
goals for the final CPP and providing the base case generation capacity of coal to be 1.462 
million gigawatt-hours (“GWh”) in 2020), with U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE PROPOSED CARBON POLLUTION 
GUIDELINES FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS AND EMISSION STANDARDS FOR MODIFIED 
AND RECONSTRUCTED POWER PLANTS 3-6 to -7, 3-27 (2014) [hereinafter CPP RIA, 
PROPOSED RULE], http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-06/documents
/20140602ria-clean-power-plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/V73Q-3AG4] (listing state goals for 
the proposed CPP and providing the base case generation capacity of coal to be 1.665 
million GWh in 2020). 
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Table 5: Projected Coal-Fired Unit Retirements by 2030 for the 
CPP260 
 




















ERCOT 2 729 365 1983 2 2.78 7.80 
FRCC 8 1,459 122 1995 8 5.56 2.90 
MISO 65 4,654 21 1958 5 17.75 21.84 
PJM 61 7,595 40 1965 24 28.97 22.89 
SERC 31 8,212 249 1983 18 31.32 20.57 
SPP 19 1,923 30 1968 8 7.33 10.24 
WECC 22 1,647 33 1976 4 6.28 12.02 
All 
Regions 
208 26,219 30 1965 69 100 100 
 
Overall from the standpoint of grid stability and the distribution 
of the regulatory burdens, the preceding analysis, illustrated by 
Tables 3 through 5, shows that the scale of the retirements from the 
CSAPR, MATS rule, and CPP are modest compared with regional 
generation capacities, and that large reserve margins exist in most 
regions to offset the anticipated losses.261 Projected retirement rates 
are largely proportional across regions, relative to either coal 
generation capacity or annual generation, and few regions bear a 
disproportionate share of the regulatory burdens. Moreover, the 
characteristics of the at-risk coal units suggest that the great majority 
of the plants that are likely to retire are close to the end of their life 
cycles and long ago recouped their capital costs. 
Finally, compliance with these rules, while costly in absolute 
terms, is low relative to the annual operating expenses and revenue of 
the electric utility sector. The compliance costs of the MATS rule and 
the CPP have been projected to be $9.6 billion and $8.4 billion, 
respectively.262 Yet these costs represent less than 5% of the 
industry’s expenses and revenue, which in 2012 were $235.7 billion 
and $270.9 billion, respectively.263 For the MATS rule, which is the 
 
 260. See IPM 5.13, supra note 208. For simplicity of review, only the regions with 
significant reductions in generation capacity are included in Table 5. 
 261. The most highly impacted regions all also have large numbers and capacities 
(about 75 GW) of combustion turbines and combination oil/gas steamers that are either in 
reserve or operating at very low capacity factors, and thus could further offset lost capacity 
from retirements of coal-fired power plants. 
 262. MATS RIA, supra note 106, at ES-1; CPP RIA, FINAL RULE, supra note 121, at 
ES-22. 
 263. CPP RIA, FINAL RULE, supra note 121, at 2-42. 
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most costly of the three, the projected yearly price increases for 
electricity peak at 3.1% above the base case nationally according to 
EPA.264 The projected rate increases for the CPP are slightly higher, 
with the national average peaking in 2020 at 3.2% above the base case 
and regional increases in NYISO, PJM, and ISO-NE running as high 
as 6%.265 However, the projected impact on the average annual cost 
of electricity is lower—with increases peaking below 3% in 2020 and 
going negative by 2025—because of reductions in demand associated 
with energy efficiency.266 In short, overall the projected impacts on 
retail electricity prices and annual expenditures are very modest, 
particularly in comparison to their benefits—a subject to which we 
turn next.267 
C. Distribution of Compliance Benefits 
The analysis thus far has focused exclusively on the costs of 
EPA’s rules; this Section evaluates the environmental and health 
benefits of these rules. One of the defining characteristics of 
regulations under the CAA is their favorable benefit-to-cost ratios,268 
 
 264. MATS RIA, supra note 106, at 3-24 (listing the increases by corresponding NERC 
reliability regions, which amounts to less than a third of a cent per kWh). The highest 
increase in cost regionally is projected to occur in SPP, at 6.3% or about half a cent per 
kWh, but electricity prices in the region would still be below the national average, even in 
the absence of the MATS rule. Id. The estimates for the CSAPR predict increases of less 
than 2% nationally in 2012 and dropping below 1% by 2014; the highest regional increase 
from 2012 to 2020 is roughly 3% or about a third of a cent per kWh. CSAPR RIA, supra 
note 89, at 266. 
 265. CPP RIA, FINAL RULE, supra note 121, at 3-37 to -39 (this amounts to about 0.3 
cents per kWh). The EIA estimates that electricity prices will peak at 3% to 7% above 
business as usual, and in many regions return to baseline levels by 2030. U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN., supra note 258, at 21. In some regions, such as the Southwest and the 
Southeast, prices are projected to increase 10% to 11% by 2030, but even in those areas 
electricity prices typically drop under 5% above baseline by 2040. Id. at 21, 41–43. 
 266. In its final rule, EPA estimates that average annual electricity bills will rise by 
2.7% in 2020 above the base case, and then fall below it by 3.8% by 2025 and 7% by 2030. 
CPP RIA, FINAL RULE, supra note 121, at 3-40. According to the EIA, residential 
expenditures on electricity will peak at 3.4% in 2020 and fall to 0.03% by 2040; for 
commercial customers, they peak at 3.9% in 2020 and fall to –1.3% by 2040; and for 
industrial customers, they peak at 4.6% in 2020 and fall to 0.2% by 2040. U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN., supra note 258, at 44. 
 267. The more plausible claim is that these rules threaten the coal industry, but this 
perspective gets things backwards. The coal industry has benefited for years from shifting 
its enormous environmental externalities to society. If what matters is social welfare, 
protecting the coal industry in its current state is not in the national interest. However, 
recognition of the impact of these rules on the coal industry may explain some of the 
political opposition to the rules. See infra Part IV. 
 268. See Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act from 1990 to 2020, the Second 
Prospective Study, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview
/benefits-and-costs-clean-air-act-1990-2020-second-prospective-study [https://perma.cc/RKL6-
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and these rules are no exception.269 The MATS, CSAPR, and CPP all 
boast benefits greatly exceeding their costs, despite EPA’s omission 
of numerous difficult-to-monetize benefits.270 However, EPA’s 
primary focus is on national-level costs and benefits—state and 
regional numbers are only of secondary concern.271 This Section 
examines the regional distribution of the regulatory benefits.272 We 
find that the benefits tend to be concentrated in the regions where 
electric utilities will be most impacted by EPA rules. This really 
 
7EVG] (last updated Sept. 6, 2016); see also Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, 
Rethinking Health-Based Environmental Standards, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1184, 1236–47 
(2014) (illustrating that the benefits of rules establishing NAAQS standards almost always 
exceed costs and, even then, the standards fall short of maximizing net benefits). 
 269. This characteristic has been demonstrated in a broad range of analyses, ranging 
from long-term cost-benefit assessments of the CAA, to examinations of specific market 
sectors, to regional and state-level assessments using a mix of economic indicators. See 
Ben Machol & Sarah Rizk, Economic Value of U.S. Fossil Fuel Electricity Health Impacts, 
52 ENVT. INT’L 75, 78 (2013); Nicholas Z. Muller, Boosting GDP Growth by Accounting 
for the Environment, 345 SCI. 873, 873–74 (2014); Muller et al., supra note 45, at 1664–65. 
See generally Tammy M. Thompson et al., A Systems Approach to Evaluating the Air 
Quality Co-Benefits of US Carbon Policies, 4 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 917 (2014) 
(presenting a systems approach to quantify air quality co-benefits of U.S. policies to 
reduce carbon emissions and finding that “monetized human health benefits associated 
with air quality improvements can offset 26% to 1,050% of the cost of US carbon 
policies”). About 87% of the GED associated with coal-fired power plants is attributable 
to SO2 emissions, with PM2.5 and NOx each accounting for about 6.5% of the total GED; 
about 94% of the GED is attributable to increased mortality. Muller et al., supra note 45, 
at 1669. 
 270. See, e.g., CPP RIA, FINAL RULE, supra note 121, at ES-10 to -14. For MATS, net 
benefits are $27 to $80 billion per year, compared to total annual costs of $9.6 billion. 
MATS RIA, supra note 106, at ES-1. For CSAPR, net benefits are $120 to $280 billion per 
year compared to total annual costs of $0.81 billion. CSAPR RIA, supra note 89, at 1–2. 
For the CPP, the net benefits are projected to be $17 to $27 billion per year by 2025 and 
rise to $26 to $45 billion per year by 2030, while total expected annual costs for those years 
are $1.0 and $8.4 billion, respectively. CPP RIA, FINAL RULE, supra note 121, at ES-22 to 
-23. 
 271. Simply finding the state-level data in the RIAs takes time and persistence, as they 
are buried hundreds of pages into the analyses and are not mentioned or discussed in the 
executive summaries for the rules. Nor are they made available as separate data files along 
with the detailed emissions data and modeling that EPA very effectively (and 
transparently) posts on its website. Instead, the data must be extracted from the PDF 
versions of the RIAs and then imported into spreadsheet or statistical programs. 
 272. The regional numbers we calculate are based on state-level estimates EPA 
derived for the CSAPR and MATS rules. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, COMBINED 
NATIONAL AND STATE-LEVEL HEALTH BENEFITS FOR THE CROSS-STATE AIR 
POLLUTION RULE AND MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS STANDARDS 8 (2011), http://www
.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/Benefits/casprmats.pdf [https://perma.cc/D536-F3UZ]. As discussed 
further below, state-level estimates are not available for the CPP. See supra notes 288–92 
and accompanying text. It is important to note that all of the state and regional estimates 
are based on the distribution of benefits overall from the EPA rules—none of the 
estimates distinguishes between benefits from emissions reductions that occur within a 
state or region versus those that occur outside a state or region. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 339 (2017) 
2017] U.S. ENERGY POLICY 393 
should not be surprising, as regulatory costs naturally track reductions 
in emissions of air pollutants regionally. The analysis continues to 
focus on regional data because they are more tractable to evaluate 
regional than state data,273 and are consistent with the scale at which 
electric grids are actually managed. 
1.  Benefits of the Mercury and Air Toxics Standards 
The MATS rule is widely criticized for requiring installation of 
the most expensive pollution controls on coal-fired plants.274 As noted 
above, its benefits nevertheless exceed its costs by a factor of three to 
eight.275 Table 6 below disaggregates the national statistics into 
regional data, but focuses on the regions with the largest fleets of 
coal-fired power plants. The percentage of coal-fired power 
generation capacity regionally is provided as a benchmark for a 
distribution of the emissions reductions and benefits that is 
proportional to the size of the coal fleets regionally.276 The benefits of 
the MATS rule are given both in terms of lives saved (the overriding 







 273. That is, comparing six or eight regions is easier than comparing data for forty-
eight states. 
 274. See David Siegel, 23 States Tell High Court EPA’s Mercury Regs Too Costly, 
LAW360 (July 21, 2014, 3:03 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/559109/23-states-tell-
high-court-epa-s-mercury-regs-too-costly. 
 275. See supra Section I.B.2. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan v. EPA, 
EPA will need to justify imposing such significant compliance costs on industry when it 
revisits mercury regulation. 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2705–06, 2711–12 (2015). As noted in Section 
I.B.2, the benefits of mercury regulation include co-benefits associated with reduced 
emissions of pollutants other than mercury. See Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2706, 2711. 
The Court’s Michigan decision has created some uncertainty about whether EPA may 
reasonably base its decision to regulate on an analysis that credits these co-benefits, real 
though they may be. 
 276. As previously noted, this statement assumes that an equitable sharing of the 
regulatory burdens would require each region to reduce its emissions to a level that is 
proportional to its contribution to the air pollution externalities. Here, power generation 
capacity is used as a proxy for each region’s relative contribution, which, as Table 2 shows, 
tracks the emissions of the major pollutants at the regional level. This is not the only basis 
upon which to assess the equity of EPA’s regulations (emissions reductions could be 
proportional to the difference between a region’s average emissions rate and the national 
average), but by erring conservatively on the side of regions more reliant on coal, our 
findings below that EPA’s rules are generally fair at the regional level are less vulnerable 
to challenges of bias. 
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SPP 4.52 4.59 11.03 5.54 208–522 $1,760–
4,400 
WECC 10.57 13.58 10.33 13.04 119–309 $1,020–
2,484 





Two broad patterns emerge from the data. First, as previously 
mentioned, emissions reductions in most cases are roughly 
proportional to the regional generation capacity. For example, 
ERCOT has about 7% of the coal-based generation capacity, and its 
share of emissions reductions for the three pollutants ranges from 5% 
to 10%. Only minor disparities exist with respect to the application of 
the MATS regulations regionally. The Southeast (SERC) is arguably 
an exception, but this reflects the fact that SERC coal plants 
substantially lag other regions in their adoption of mercury 
controls.278 Second, benefits closely track local emissions reductions 
(and thus costs) because, as the EPA data show, most of the harms 
associated with air pollution from coal plants occur regionally. 
Thus, the case for regulation based on economic efficiency holds 
at the regional level—benefits substantially exceed costs at both the 
national and regional levels. Importantly, this is true even when a 
region bears a higher share of the costs precisely because regional 
 
 277. See supra note 272. For simplicity of review, only the regions with significant 
benefits from reductions in mercury emissions are included in Table 6. 
 278. Fifty-nine percent of the coal-fired units in SERC have low or no emissions 
controls for mercury, whereas the national average is 42%. The reduction of SO2 
emissions in SPP was also disproportionate to its generation capacity, but this is a 
byproduct of the mercury controls, which also impact SO2 emissions, and the low rate of 
adoption for SO2 controls in SPP (43% versus the national average 72%). 
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benefits rise with regional costs. This correlation is evident in the 
starkest example from the data: the relatively larger emissions 
reductions in SERC (30% to 37% versus its 20% of generation 
capacity) results in greater benefits that account for roughly 35% of 
the aggregate benefits nationally. In sum, while mercury and co-
pollutants such as PM2.5 have national and even global impacts, the 
regional health benefits of the MATS rule offset the regional costs of 
complying with it by a substantial margin. 
2.  Benefits of the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule 
Because the CSAPR is designed to mitigate interstate air 
pollution (specifically, to remedy the problem of midwestern and 
southern plants sending pollution to downwind states to the east), 
there ought to be regional disparities between the respective 
distributions of its costs and benefits. Table 7 confirms that this is true 
for certain regions: SPP receives about 2% of the monetized benefits 
but accounts for 25% of the reduction in NOx emissions, and MISO 
receives 15% of the monetized benefits but accounts for 26% and 
21% of the reductions in NOx and SO2 emissions, respectively. By 
contrast, SERC comes out ahead, with SERC responsible for about 
15% of the emissions reductions while receiving approximately 23% 
of the monetized benefits. In the case of MISO, although the region 
receives a lower share of the benefits, its emission reduction burden is 
very close to its share of generation capacity. While SPP bears a 
disproportionately large burden of reducing NOx emissions (about 
five times greater than its share of capacity), that is because the 
region has been a laggard in the adoption of NOx control 
technologies.279 
 
 279. In SPP, just 36% of coal units have some kind of NOx controls versus 52% 
nationally. 
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  NOx Total SO2 Total NOx Summer   
ERCOT 7.21 2.7 7.3 4.4 700–1,800 $6,100–
15,000 
FRCC 2.54 7 0 13.9 630–1,600 $5,400–
13,000 












SPP 4.52 25.3 4.1 26 275–711 $2,400–
5,870 





Despite disparities in the distribution of CSAPR’s costs and 
benefits, the compliance costs for the CSAPR nationally are relatively 
low—less than $1 billion annually—while the benefits are 
enormous—more than a hundred times greater than its costs.281 
Accordingly, although the benefits are not equally shared across 
different regions of the country, the large magnitude of the benefits 
ensures that costs will be more than offset even in the regions 
receiving a smaller share of the national total. For example, even if 
electric utilities in SPP bear 26% of the annual costs (i.e., costs are 
roughly proportional to emissions reductions), the regional costs 
would amount to $211 million annually,282 which is less than 10% of 
the lower bound of the benefits SPP would receive. 
The CSAPR powerfully illustrates how the enormous benefits of 
Clean Air Act rules promote Pareto improvements (i.e., no one is 
worse off on a region by region basis), even when the costs of a rule 
 
 280. See supra note 272. For simplicity of review, only the regions with significant 
benefits from emissions reductions are included in Table 7. 
 281. For a discussion regarding CSAPR costs and benefits, see supra note 270 and 
accompanying text. 
 282. For a discussion regarding CSAPR costs and benefits, see supra note 270 and 
accompanying text. 
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are unevenly spread.283 In each wholesale market, the monetized 
benefits of CSAPR dwarf the costs (despite the few regional cost 
disparities), even using quite conservative assumptions.284 Thus, these 
rules go far beyond the Pareto condition—the net benefits in each 
region are large and effectively nullify any unevenness in the 
distribution of costs. Moreover, the CSAPR is forcing upwind utilities 
to internalize costs they had previously shifted to downwind 
communities. Indeed, before the rule, people in the upwind states 
enjoyed inexpensive electricity partly because they could shift those 
costs to people in the downwind states. 
3.  Benefits of the Clean Power Plan 
Recall that pursuant to CAA section 111(d), EPA has proposed 
guidelines according to which states will set standards reflecting the 
“best system of emissions reduction” (“BSER”) that take into 
account costs and any non-air quality health, environmental, and 
energy impacts.285 In particular, EPA’s approval guidelines establish 
state-by-state emission reduction goals based on the “emission 
reduction opportunities and existing state programs and measures, 
and characteristics of the electricity system.”286 Thus, EPA assigns 
more aggressive goals to those states that have a broader range of 
cost-effective options for reducing GHG emissions; conversely, it 
assigns less aggressive goals to those states that have fewer options. 
These differential objectives reflect EPA’s attempt to equalize 
compliance costs across states, thereby mitigating potential inequities 
between states with respect to the economic burdens of the CPP.287 
One of the challenges for this analysis is that, as EPA 
acknowledges, “[g]iven the flexibilities afforded states in complying 
with the emission guidelines, the benefits, cost and economic impacts 
reported in [its] RIA are not definitive estimates [but] are instead 
illustrative of approaches that states may take.”288 One consequence 
 
 283. This is not to say that these rules produce Pareto improvements on subregional 
grid stability. See supra note 227. But their huge benefit-cost ratios do mean that these 
rules yield Kaldor-Hicks improvements (i.e., overall social welfare whereby aggregate 
benefits outweigh the aggregate costs) both nationally and regionally. See supra note 271. 
 284. For a discussion regarding CSAPR costs and benefits, see supra note 270 and 
accompanying text. 
 285. See CPP RIA, FINAL RULE, supra note 121, at ES-1 to -2; text accompanying 
supra note 116. 
 286. CPP RIA, PROPOSED RULE, supra note 259, at ES-2. 
 287. The CPP offers states additional flexibility to achieve emissions reductions 
through a variety of methods. See CPP RIA, FINAL RULE, supra note 121, at ES-1 to -4. 
 288. Id. at ES-3. EPA has translated the state-level BSER standards into “rate-based” 
and “mass-based” approaches that enhance the flexibility of the rule. Id. at ES-3 to -5. 
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of this uncertainty is that the most granular level of EPA’s analysis is 
conducted at a broad super-regional level, which divides the country 
into “East” and “West,” as well as singling out California for its own 
analysis.289 EPA’s super-regional East-West analysis exposes one 
unmistakable geographic pattern of the rule’s benefits—roughly 95% 
of the benefits associated with reducing the emissions of conventional 
co-pollutants occur in the East.290 And as with the MATS rule, a 
majority of those benefits are co-benefits attributable to reductions in 
SO2 and NOx emissions from coal-fired power plants.291 Indeed, co-
benefits account for 48% to 69% of the CPP’s monetized benefits, 
which suggests the rule’s benefits will be distributed unevenly around 
the country.292 
To try to estimate the regional distribution of CPP benefits, we 
used a mix of proxies, estimates of emissions reductions by state for 
conventional pollutants, and independent analyses from a study of the 
health benefits by state for an analogous regulatory program; the 
analyses were conducted by an independent group of researchers 
from Harvard University, Boston University, and Syracuse University 
(“Health Co-Benefits Study”).293 The picture that emerges from this 
analysis is mixed. As indicated by EPA’s super-regional data, there 
are clear interstate and regional disparities evident in the emissions 
reductions projections. The ERCOT and MISO regions each are 
responsible for a disproportionate share of GHG emissions 
reductions when measured against their projected annual generation 
in 2018, whereas the standards for SERC and WECC are relatively 
 
Each of the approaches is premised on states employing mitigation measures drawn from 
three classes or “building blocks,” but the specific mix is left up to the states and the 
regulations allow them to develop plans with other states regionally. Id. at ES-1 to -4. 
 289. Id. at 4-20 to -24. 
 290. Id. at 4-24 to -25. 
 291. Id. at ES-6 to -7. 
 292. For a discussion regarding CPP costs and benefits, see supra note 270. By contrast, 
one would expect the climate benefits from the rule to be distributed relatively evenly, or 
to be subject to such large uncertainties at the subcontinental level that estimates of 
benefits will only be possible at large scales, thereby effectively precluding reliable 
assessment of interstate disparities. 
 293. See generally CHARLES DRISCOLL ET AL., CO-BENEFITS OF CARBON 
STANDARDS, PART 1: AIR POLLUTION CHANGES UNDER DIFFERENT 111D OPTIONS 
FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS (2014), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c9a5
/bef702ec5920c5d0f99f1e697589b661d1d1.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8WQ-NWUC] (estimating 
state-level effects in multiple policy scenarios). The Health Co-Benefits Study includes a 
scenario, Scenario 2, that was designed to resemble the regulatory framework for the CPP. 
See JOEL SCHWARTZ ET AL., HEALTH CO-BENEFITS OF CARBON STANDARDS FOR 
EXISTING POWER PLANTS: PART 2 OF THE CO-BENEFITS OF CARBON STANDARDS 
STUDY 1–2 (2014), http://www.chgeharvard.org/sites/default/files/userfiles2/Health
%20Co-Benefits%20of%20Carbon%20Standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/VC45-R9UZ]. 
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relaxed, as illustrated in Table 8 below.294 However, similar to the 
other rules, the correlation between emissions of CO2 and 
conventional pollutants implies that those states with more stringent 
emissions goals will also reap greater co-benefits. And because EPA 
has a legal mandate to equalize the cost burden across states, these 
greater reductions should be achievable at a cost that is not markedly 
higher than costs incurred by states subject to weaker goals. 
 
Table 8: Regional Emissions Reductions from the CPP Using State 
Plans295 
 
Region Generation† Reductions Nationally  
by 2025 (%) 
Reductions Nationally  
by 2030 (%) 
 (%) CO2 NOx SO2 CO2 NOx SO2 
ERCOT 9.1 21.8 16.5 29.0 18.9 13.4 19.3 
FRCC 6.3 4.1 4.2 3.7 5.5 6.1 11.5 
MISO 12.0 26.1 26.6 23.5 23.4 25.9 22.2 
PJM 19.1 15.3 24.7 21.8 15.1 22.4 18.9 
SERC 20.4 15.3 15.6 15.2 20.0 17.8 21.0 
SPP 7.1 3.3 5.2 2.1 4.3 6.7 3.0 
WECC 18.2 11.9 6.7 4.8 10.4 7.0 4.1 
Total 92.2 97.8 99.5 100.0 97.6 99.4 100.0 
†
Percent of generation nationally from all sources based on IPM 5.15 Base Case for 2018. 
The Health Co-Benefits Study complicates this picture insofar as 
it suggests that co-benefits of the CPP may not be so localized. As 
summarized in Table 9, its results suggest that the ERCOT region is 
likely to bear a disproportionate share of the burden for reducing 
CO2 emissions, and is likely to receive much less in the way of 
countervailing health co-benefits. Conversely, the states in the PJM 
region are subject to relatively weaker emissions reduction goals, and 
yet they receive a disproportionate share of the benefits—30% of the 
total, which is almost double their relative contribution to reducing 
emissions of CO2 and about 30% greater than their share of annual 
power generation nationally. These results suggest that the 
distribution of health co-benefits has the potential to exacerbate, 
rather than offset, regional or interstate disparities in compliance 
costs. 
 
 294. The estimates in Table 8 are limited to the years 2025 and 2030 because these are 
dates that overlap with the three-stage “glide path” that EPA established for meeting 
emissions goals under the final BSER standards. CPP RIA, FINAL RULE, supra note 121, 
at ES-3. 
 295. This analysis is based on EPA’s IPM 5.15 Base Case and Rate Case projections. 
See IPM 5.15, supra note 208. For simplicity of review, only the regions with significant 
emissions reductions are included in Table 8. 
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Table 9: Harvard Study of Health Co-Benefits from CPP296 
 











ERCOT 230 6.4 52–410 79 38–120 
FRCC 110 3.1 24–190 38 18–58 
MISO 873 24.5 195–1,538 273 137–401 
PJM 1,092 30.6 242–1,916 292 154–424 
SERC 660 18.5 150–1,178 215 105–326 
SPP 122 3.4 28–217 43 21–65 
WECC 185 5.2 43–323 59 27–91 
Total 3,568 91.7 799–6,288 1,073 540–1,593 
 
A few caveats are in order here. First, as noted earlier, since 
EPA designed the CPP rule to spread costs evenly across states and 
regions, the magnitude of emissions reductions is a poor proxy for 
compliance costs. Second, the CPP may still represent a Pareto 
improvement (on a region-by-region basis) even if costs and benefits 
are distributed unevenly, so long as benefits exceed costs within each 
region. Although not as dramatic as those under the CSAPR, EPA 
estimates for the monetized benefits of the CPP are significantly 
higher than the regulatory costs—by at least a factor of four.297 
Accordingly, even for regions such as ERCOT, if we were to assume 
(conservatively and incorrectly) that costs are directly proportional to 
emissions reductions, the benefits would still outweigh the costs—for 
ERCOT the benefits would be 1.8 to 2.6 times greater than the costs 
by 2030.298 
 
 296. The data are taken from Scenario 2 of the Harvard study, which is the closest 
analogue to the CPP. See JOEL SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 293, app. 5, at 7–12. For 
simplicity of review, only the regions with significant benefits from emissions reductions 
are included in Table 9. Id. Confidence intervals (“CI”) are used with respect to lives 
saved and hospital visits avoided in this table. 
 297. CPP RIA, FINAL RULE, supra note 121, at ES-22 to -23. For the rate-based 
approach (3% discount rate), EPA estimates are as follows: (1) 2025: climate benefits of 
$10 billion, health benefits of $7.4 to $18 billion, compliance costs of $1.0 billion (a ratio of 
7.4 to 18); (2) 2030: climate benefits of $20 billion, health benefits of $26 to $45 billion, 
compliance costs of $8.4 billion (a ratio of 5.5 to 7.7). Id. 
 298. This calculation is based on multiplying total costs by the region’s percent share of 
CO2 emissions reductions to obtain the regional share of costs, and by multiplying the 
climate and health co-benefits by the region’s share of health co-benefits from the Health 
Co-Benefits Study. This estimate is conservative both on the cost side, as costs will not be 
directly proportional to emissions reductions, and the benefits side, as the distribution of 
climate benefits will not track the health co-benefits and will in all likelihood be higher for 
regions such as ERCOT. In 2025, the calculation for ERCOT is as follows:  
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Thus, each of the EPA rules enhances welfare nationally and 
within each regional wholesale electricity market. In most regions, the 
geographic distribution of the benefits from emissions reductions is 
roughly commensurate with the distribution of compliance costs. 
Depending on the EPA rule, some regions capture more of the 
benefits than others, and some regions bear more of the costs than 
others. However, each rule produces positive net benefits within each 
region, and in most cases where cost disparities exist, they are 
projected to be small relative to the total benefits at the regional 
level. While the analysis stops short of state-by-state comparisons, it 
suggests that for most states (coal-producing regions may be 
exempted299) the net benefits of these rules will be positive—and 
typically by large margins as well. 
IV.  REASSESSING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ENERGY 
POLICY DEBATE 
The preceding analysis aims to bridge the gap between the 
perspectives of grid managers and environmental regulators by 
scaling down EPA’s cost-benefit information to the regional (grid) 
level. In so doing, it undermines many of the distributional objections 
to EPA rules raised by critics: that regional cost disparities (where 
they exist) are almost always modest and are dwarfed in most cases 
by the regional benefits of each rule. Moreover, the data indicate that, 
while subregional reliability disruptions cannot be ruled out, very few 
regions are likely to be disparately vulnerable to the unquantified risk 
of disruptive grid instabilities at the local level. Thus, while the 
findings do not negate the concerns raised by many energy regulators 
about the potential for significant subregional threats to electricity 
supplies and reliability, they do put regional reliability concerns into 
 
Regional costs	=	0.218	×	1.0	=	$218 million  
Regional benefits	=	0.064	×	17.4	/	28	=	~$1.11–1.79 billion.  
See supra notes 295–97 and accompanying tables. In 2030, the calculation for ERCOT is as follows:  
Regional costs	=	0.189	×	8.4	=	$1.59 billion 
Regional benefits	=	0.064	×	46	/	65	=	~$2.94–4.16 billion. 
See supra notes 295–97 and accompanying tables.  
 299. We have not examined the net benefits of these rules in coal-producing states, nor 
have we attempted a broader analysis of costs and benefits beyond those associated with 
power sector changes effected by these rules. Rather, one might speculate that in such an 
analysis, costs associated with job losses in the power and coal sectors in coal-producing 
states might outweigh the benefits of emissions reductions. Similarly, a broader analysis 
might also suggest that the benefits to natural gas-producing states (like Texas) might be 
significant, as gas-fired power generation replaces coal-fired power generation. 
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their larger context, and should give pause to a Trump administration 
inclined to repeal or weaken these rules. 
The common spatial scale of regional data thus resolves the 
apparent inconsistencies between concerns raised by grid managers 
about stable electricity supplies and EPA’s highly favorable cost-
benefit analyses. They are not so much inconsistent with each other as 
they are operating on distinct sets of starting assumptions that are 
dictated by the differences in their respective spatial scales and 
criteria. This is an important distinction because it shows that the 
perspectives of grid managers should not be read as a challenge to 
EPA’s analyses but instead as augmenting them—the debate cannot 
and should not be reduced to a dichotomy with EPA on one side and 
grid managers on the other. Neither the substance of grid managers’ 
concerns discussed above nor, in most cases, the concerns they raise 
about EPA’s rules are consistent with such a view. While we have no 
illusions that more detailed and nuanced cost-benefit analyses will 
neutralize the ideological battles between the political parties and the 
powerful interest group influence on regulatory policymaking, this 
information can help reduce the polarizing influence of such political 
forces. EPA might use subnational analyses of the distributional 
effects of rules to further strengthen its conclusion that the benefits of 
its rules exceed the costs. Moreover, the availability of such analyses 
could influence conflict between EPA and the states over the 
implementation of these rules by educating voters about the impacts 
of rules in their neighborhoods. That is, careful consideration of the 
regional data allows one to disentangle the valid technical concerns 
from the political demagoguery. 
These observations suggest two questions. First, if the analysis 
shows that the EPA rules represent Pareto improvements nationally 
and regionally,300 what accounts for the preponderance of opposition 
 
 300. Putting this Article’s analysis and the EPA analysis aside, many other studies 
support the notion that the net benefits of the rules are positive. See, e.g., JOHN LARSEN 
ET AL., REMAKING AMERICAN POWER: POTENTIAL ENERGY MARKET IMPACTS OF 
EPA’S PROPOSED GHG EMISSION PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR EXISTING 
ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS 46–48 (2014), http://csis.org/files/publication/141107_Ladislaw
_RemakingAmerPower_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WQW-NS59] (discussing how states 
can best realize the benefits of the CPP); CONRAD SCHNEIDER, CLEAN AIR TASK 
FORCE, POWER SWITCH: AN EFFECTIVE, AFFORDABLE APPROACH TO REDUCING 
CARBON POLLUTION FROM EXISTING FOSSIL-FUELED POWER PLANTS 4 (2014), 
http://www.catf.us/resources/publications/files/Power_Switch.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZP62-
7FT9]. Because the rules trigger emissions reductions that avert thousands of premature 
deaths, the dollar value of the benefits of the rules is very large. See supra note 270 and 
accompanying text. Moving beyond the air impacts, even Texas—the regional market that 
combines relatively low reserve margins with significant numbers of plant retirements—
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to the rules and for the litigation that they have generated? Second, 
putting aside the benefits of the rules and focusing only on costs, what 
explains the weak correlation between the regional impacts of the 
rules and the positions taken by market regulators (and particularly 
the state public utility commissions (“PUCs”) within them)? These 
inconsistencies highlight not only the divergence between valid 
technical concerns and politics but also the variability of political 
forces at play in different regional energy markets. 
As to the first question, there are several possible answers. The 
first and most obvious answer is that for the coal industry, these rules 
do not produce Pareto improvements. To the contrary, the EPA rules 
are archetypes of policies for which costs are borne by a few 
industries while the benefits are diffusely shared by the general 
public—conditions in which the bearers of the costs are much more 
likely than the beneficiaries to participate in the policymaking 
process. EPA rules threaten the profitability of coal mining 
companies and coal-fired power plants. Those companies and their 
employees are identifiably at risk, can easily coordinate their lobbying 
efforts,301 and have compelling economic reasons to oppose these 
rules. The beneficiaries of these rules, by contrast, are the tens of 
thousands of Americans who will be protected against the illnesses 
and premature deaths associated with uncontrolled air emissions, or 
who will (decades from now) avoid harms resulting from climate 
change. Not only are these beneficiaries far flung and difficult to 
organize, most of them cannot yet be identified,302 and thus are not 
directly represented in the policymaking process.303 Therefore, 
politicians (including governors, state attorneys general, and public 
 
benefits not only from pollution reduction but also from the projected increased sales of 
natural gas to generators in other markets as more gas-fired plants operate more often as a 
result of these rules. See LARSEN ET AL., supra, at 42. 
 301. Interest group theorists have long posited this basis for outsized influence of 
business groups in the political process. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 33–34 (Schocken 
ed., 1969) (1975); E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S 
VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 34–35 (1960) (“The flaw in the pluralist heaven is 
that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent.”). 
 302. That is, most who get sick and die prematurely from ingesting pollutants from 
coal-fired power plants do not know that it is coal-fired power that killed them or 
hastened their death. 
 303. To the extent they are represented, they are represented by proxies—NGOs and 
other groups standing in their stead. Some scholars argue that groundswells of public 
interest can and have overcome this interest group bias in the policy process. See, e.g., 
Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 
60 (1992); James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in 
the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 294 (1990). 
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utility commissioners in some states) have an electoral incentive to 
represent the economic interests on which costs are concentrated and 
less incentive to represent the broader public. Politicians can 
influence unelected public utility commissioners through the power of 
appointment; state actors, in turn, may be able to influence regional 
organizations (like ISOs/RTOs and NERC regions) of which they are 
members. This bias can influence politicians and decision makers in 
either (or both) of two ways—one cynical and one innocent. The 
innocent way is that politicians and decision makers, hearing from 
one side and not the other, sincerely conclude that the net benefits of 
the rules are negative, and so oppose them; the cynical way is that 
politicians and decision makers are aware of the highly favorable 
cost-benefit ratios, but ignore them to enhance the likelihood of their 
reelection or reappointment.304 Given the overwhelming support for 
the notion that the net benefits of these rules are positive, developing 
a sincere belief to the contrary strains credulity or requires turning a 
blind eye to the clear balance of the evidence.305 
Second, many of the organizations registering objections to these 
rules are charged with ensuring the reliable and efficient operation of 
electricity markets. While general principles of administrative law 
may require them to consider all elements of the public interest,306 
their core missions do not include environmental protection, or even 
the broad maximization of net benefits; rather, their job is to keep the 
lights on. Therefore, they have an institutional incentive to object to 
policies that might introduce reliability risks, even if a comprehensive 
cost-benefit analysis shows that these risks are small compared to the 
rules’ environmental benefits. NERC, regional reliability 
organizations, FERC, ISOs/RTOs, and state PUCs all fall into this 
category and thus may be biased towards safeguarding their 
institutional mandates. This bias may be exacerbated by the 
phenomenon of loss aversion,307 which holds that people and 
 
 304. Indeed, James Coleman suggests an additional layer of cynicism with his finding that 
regulated companies tend to reassure investors that regulatory costs are manageable while 
complaining to regulators that those costs are not manageable. See Coleman, supra note 134, at 47. 
 305. The psychological processes that lead to climate denial and science denial in 
environmental policy debates are beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of 
these issues, see, for example, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychology of Global Climate 
Change, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 299, 303–13 (2000). 
 306. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 
(1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419–21 (1971). 
 307. For a more general discussion of the phenomena of loss aversion and risk aversion 
in the behavioral sciences, see generally JAMES MONTIER, BEHAVIOURAL INVESTING: A 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO APPLYING BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE 447–52 (2007); Antoine 
Bechara, Hanna Damasio & Antonio R. Damasio, Role of the Amygdala in Decision-
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institutions are more likely to comment on regulatory proposals they 
oppose than those they support.308 
A third explanation is grounded not in interest group politics, but 
in the broader ideological conflicts that have come to dominate 
twenty-first century policymaking at the state and federal levels. The 
ideological homogeneity of the two major parties, and their increasing 
ideological distance from one another, have gridlocked Congress and 
placed states at the center of regulatory policy conflict.309 In such an 
environment, federal policy initiatives tend to be initiated by the 
executive branch (because Congress cannot act), and states 
dominated by the party opposing the president actively resist them. 
Some politicians and decision makers may oppose the EPA rules 
because they do not believe that government should intervene in 
markets to address pollution externalities, or because they distrust the 
science behind the rules.310 
Thus, Republicans’ and coal-state Democrats’ anti-EPA rhetoric 
may reflect the sincere belief that electricity producers ought to be 
able to shift the pollution externalities of coal-fired power to society, 
or that those externalities pose a much smaller risk than commonly 
thought. This occurrence is unlikely. Even the most virulent EPA 
opponents in Congress stop short of calling for the repeal of most 
environmental protection laws. In 2011, Senate Republicans 
sponsored a bill to fold EPA into the Department of Energy; 
however, those Republican senators based their case not on the 
absence of a need for environmental protection, but on efficiency 
grounds.311 
Partisan or ideological differences can also work simultaneously 
with interest group politics to motivate policymakers. They can work 
in tandem, as in solidly Republican coal states like Wyoming, or they 
can work at cross purposes, as in traditionally Democratic coal states 
 
Making, 985 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 356 (2003); Antoine Bechara et al., Deciding 
Advantageously Before Knowing the Advantageous Strategy, 275 SCI. 1293 (1997). 
 308. See, e.g., Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Tailored Participation: Modernizing the APA 
Rulemaking Procedures, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 330–32 (2009) (“Most 
empirical studies of rulemaking, as well as articles that draw on them, demonstrate limited 
participation in rulemaking and rare participation beyond involved interest groups (and 
especially business interest groups)	.	.	.	.”).  
 309. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE 
L.J. 1256, 1258–64 (2009) (documenting this trend); Freeman & Spence, supra note 11, at 8.  
 310. See Rachlinski, supra note 305, at 303–13. For additional discussion on these 
forces, see also supra Part I.  
 311. Brad Johnson, Richard Burr Introduces Bill to Abolish the EPA, HILL HEAT 
(May 6, 2011), http://www.hillheat.com/articles/2011/05/06/richard-burr-introduces-bill-to-
abolish-the-epa [https://perma.cc/B9V8-WR99]. 
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like Illinois. These dynamics may help us to understand the variation 
among market regions and states in the positions they have taken on 
the EPA rules and suggest that, in some states and regions, ideology 
is driving position taking to these rules. Just as Republican appointees 
to the FERC were more critical of the Clean Power Plan than 
Democratic appointees, regional and state institutions in more 
conservative or Republican parts of the country seem more likely to 
be critical than their counterparts in more liberal or Democratic parts 
of the country. 
As noted in Part II, two of the market regions facing the largest 
numbers of projected plant retirements (MISO, PJM) have been 
relatively circumspect and qualified in their comments on the rules 
compared to other regions facing much smaller losses (SPP, 
ERCOT).312 MISO and PJM expressed concerns about the reliability 
impacts of the EPA rules, but did so in specific ways that suggested 
solutions. For example, MISO’s reaction to the CSAPR and MATS 
rules noted the need for transmission investment to adjust to 
probable losses of capacity; it then embarked on a plan for additional 
transmission investment.313 Likewise, both MISO and PJM 
emphasized the need for longer compliance periods in their 
comments on the CPP.314 By contrast, the comments of SPP and 
ERCOT were far more antagonistic of the proposed rule.315 
To explore how ideology might influence grid managers’ position 
taking, Figure 3 depicts average ideology (specifically, average 
percentages of people identifying as conservative) in wholesale 
market regions.316 These data come from Gallup, which reports state-
by-state percentages of people who identify as conservative or liberal. 
As Figure 3 shows, these data offer only weak support for the idea 
that ideology drives position taking by market regions on EPA rules. 
Interestingly, ERCOT, SPP, SERC, and MISO all score above the 
national average on the “percent conservative” measure, and PJM 
 
 312. See supra notes 180–82, 188–90 and accompanying text. 
 313. For a description of the MISO “multi value” transmission project program, see 
Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for 
Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1834–35 (2012). 
 314. See supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text. 
 315. See supra notes 188–90 and accompanying text. 
 316. The data come from Gallup’s “State of the States” polling series. See State of the 
States, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/125066/state-states.aspx [https://perma.cc
/TZ3T-A7FX]. Specifically, the numbers in the figure average state ideologies for the 
states in each market region. We chose not to weight the state ideology scores by state 
population because states qua states are part of the client base (and membership) of ISOs/RTOs. 
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scores at the national average. PJM and MISO North317 are less 
conservative than ERCOT, SPP, and SERC, but not strikingly so. 
The other regions depicted on Figure 3, CA ISO, ISO-NE, and 
NYISO, are strikingly less conservative than the others, which may 
explain the more conciliatory tone of the ISO/RTO Council’s 
comments on the CPP (in which they all participated),318 and why the 
remaining ISOs/RTOs felt the need to submit separate comments on 
the proposal. The weakness of these effects, however, may be a 
function of the technocratic (less politically accountable) nature of 
ISOs/RTOs. ISOs/RTOs are further removed from political influence 
than public utility commissions, whose commissioners are either 
elected or appointed by elected governors. We might hypothesize that 
as nonprofit membership organizations composed of private sector 
actors, ISOs/RTOs ought to be less susceptible to ideological shifts.319 
 
Figure 3: Average of State Ideology Scores—Market Regions320 

















 317. The southern zone of MISO was added only within the last eighteen months, and so 
MISO ideology prior to 2014 is best reflected by the “MISO North” score depicted in Figure 3. 
 318. See ISO/RTO Council, supra note 184, at 1–3. 
 319. We might also hypothesize that decision making within multistate ISOs/RTOs 
whose territory covers an ideologically diverse set of states, like MISO and PJM, ought to 
be more technocratic and less ideologically driven than decision making within single state 
RTOs/ISOs, or RTOs/ISOs covering more ideologically homogenous groups of states. 
Thanks to Elizabeth Wilson for helping us with this observation. 
 320. State of the States, supra note 316. 
95 N.C. L. REV. 339 (2017) 
408 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95 
 
Partisanship and ideology loom larger, however, in state position 
taking on EPA rules. As noted in Part II, state PUC comments on the 
MATS rule and the CPP321 were mostly critical, but tended to be less 
critical coming from PUCs dominated by Democratic members. Most 
of the PUC comments on the MATS rule were unambiguously 
critical, and one was relatively neutral; all of the critical comments 
came from Republican-dominated PUCs, while the neutral comment 
came from the only Democrat-dominated PUC in the sample 
(Oregon).322 Similarly, of the many unambiguously negative 
comments submitted by PUCs in response to the CPP, only one (from 
a Republican New Mexico commissioner) came from a Democrat-
dominated PUC;323 of the several neutral or positive comments, most 
came from PUCs dominated by Democrats.324  
Partisan influence shows up even more strongly when examining 
states’ participation in court cases challenging EPA actions 
addressing coal-fired power plant pollution under the CAA. This 
occurrence is perhaps because those decisions are made by state 
attorneys general (most of whom are elected) or governors. As noted 
in Part II, when EPA rules have been challenged in court, some states 
have intervened in support of the rules, and some have intervened in 
opposition to the rules. Table 10 summarizes the party affiliations of 
governors and state attorneys general of states intervening in recent 
cases challenging EPA Clean Air Act rules that (1) reached the 
Supreme Court and (2) impact coal-fired power plants. The data show 
that states with Democratic governors and attorneys general are 
overwhelmingly more likely to intervene in support of (and less likely 
to intervene in opposition to) EPA rules being challenged in court. 
This fact is true for each of the five court cases examined, and the 
differences are fairly striking. 
 
 321. Again, these rules are the focus because they entail the highest compliance costs—
i.e., the most salient losses. 
 322. See supra notes 193–97 and accompanying text. 
 323. See Patrick H. Lyons, N.M. Pub. Regulation Comm’n, Comment Letter on 
Proposed Rule for Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Emissions from Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units 2–5 (Nov. 24, 
2014), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2013-0602-24311 [https://
perma.cc/BX2U-22ZE (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 324. See, e.g., N.H. Dep’t of Envtl. Servs. & N.H. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, Comment Letter 
on Proposed Rule for Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units 2–5 (Dec. 1, 2014), http://des.nh.gov/organization/divisions/air/tsb
/tps/climate/rggi/documents/20141201-comments-epa-cpp.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CQS-AXGH]; 
see also supra notes 198–202 and accompanying text. 
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Table 10: Party Affiliations of Attorneys General and Governors in 




(Case name before the U.S. Supreme 
Court) 









Endangerment Finding (GHGs) 
(Massachusetts v. EPA (2007)) 
1(8) 19a(11) 10(8) 0(2) 
CSAPR (ozone transport) 
(EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, 
L.P. (2014)) 
0(1) 10(9b) 20(19) 3(4) 
Tailoring Rule (GHGs) 
(Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (2014)) 
0(3) 15(12) 12(12) 0(0) 
MATS rule (mercury) 
(Michigan v. EPA (2015)c) 
0(7) 16(9) 17d(18e) 4(3) 
CPP (GHGs) 
(West Virginia v. EPA (pending)) 
6(0) 11(18) 24(23) 4(5) 
a Includes data from the District of Columbia, whose attorney general was appointed by the 
mayor at the time the litigation was initiated. 
b Includes Rhode Island’s governor, who was elected as an independent but subsequently 
changed his party affiliation to Democrat. 
c Iowa’s attorney general and governor each intervened on opposite sides of this case. 
d Includes two attorneys general appointed by Republican governors. 
e Includes Alaska, which had an elected independent (formerly Republican) governor at 
the time the case was initiated. 
 
The trends are only slightly less striking when focusing on the 
party affiliation of governors. These data seem to support the notion 
that partisanship and ideology play a role in debates over EPA’s 
regulation of coal-fired power plants. All eighteen states supporting 
the CPP have Democratic governors; twenty-four of the twenty-eight 
states opposing that rule have Republican governors. (These data 
echo anecdotal evidence of state pledges not to comply with the CPP 
once it is in effect.326) The table shows that the other recent cases 
 
 325. To access the underlying data referenced in Table 10, see Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. 
Ct. 2699, 2702–04 (2015); Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2432–34 
(2014); EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P., 134 S. Ct. 1584, 1590–92 (2014); 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 502–04 (2007); West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15-1363 
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 2015); E&E’s Power Plan Hub, supra note 120; Partisan Affiliation 
Dataset (2016) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). 
 326. Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell has urged states not to comply with the 
EPA guidelines once they become final, and state legislatures have expressed their 
opposition to the rule in a variety of ways. See Jocelyn Durkay, States’ Reactions to EPA 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 18, 2016), http:
//www.ncsl.org/research/energy/states-reactions-to-proposed-epa-greenhouse-gas-emissions-
standards635333237.aspx [https://perma.cc/HGD6-Q7X8] (summarizing state legislation); Niels 
Lesniewski, McConnell Discourages States from Crafting Clean Power Plans, ROLL CALL 
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involving CAA regulation of the power sector reflect similar partisan 
splits. These data offer further support for arguments in legal 
scholarship that states have become the locus of partisan conflict in 
the face of congressional gridlock.327 
Thus, it appears that ideology and interest group politics are 
combining to magnify political opposition to EPA rules, even though 
those rules bring positive net benefits across the country. However, 
the power of interest groups may be waning in this regulatory “war on 
coal.” Public attitudes can change, sometimes quickly, thereby 
disrupting the political calculus for politicians.328 Public opinion is 
supportive of clean energy technologies and decreasingly skeptical of 
climate science;329 at the same time, the price of alternative electric 
generation technologies (relative to coal-fired power plants) 
continues to decline. The coal industry will undoubtedly continue to 
fight aggressively against EPA regulations, but the broader political 
and economic context increasingly exhibits signs of shifting around 
them.330 
CONCLUSION 
The elevation of Donald Trump to the presidency places special 
focus on EPA’s efforts to address the environmental and health harm 
 
(Mar. 4, 2015, 3:59 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/home/mitch-mcconnell-discouraging-
states-from-crafting-clean-power-plans [https://perma.cc/8PMC-PWNS]. 
 327. See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 
1123–25, 1127–28 (2014); Heather K. Gerkin, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1745, 1785 (2005); cf. Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Energy Partisanship 65 EMORY 
L.J. 695, 722–24 (2015) (arguing that energy policymakers can circumvent partisan gridlock 
by focusing on policy subsets over which there is less disagreement and by making policy 
in arenas other than Congress); Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy 
Governance, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2014) (exploring hybrid governance solutions to 
energy problems). 
 328. Indeed, there is growing evidence that public attitudes, even among conservative 
voters, are shifting in favor of EPA’s regulations. See, e.g., Davis Burroughs, Republican 
Voters Generally Support Clean Power Plan, MORNING CONSULT (Aug. 7, 2015), 
http://morningconsult.com/2015/08/republican-voters-generally-support-clean-power-plan-
fundamentals/) [https://perma.cc/T2ZW-QGEG]. 
 329. Both of these trends are evident from the Spring 2016 University of Texas Energy 
Poll. See UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, ENERGY POLL 11–12, 19 (2016), http://
www.utenergypoll.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Topline-Wave-10.pdf [https://perma.cc
/BWM3-TTUT] (posting poll answers to questions 126a and 126b regarding climate change 
and question 171ec regarding renewable energy). 
 330. For a discussion of how groundswells of public opinion can overcome interest 
group opposition to regulation, see Pope, supra note 303, at 297–98. See also MARK A. 
SMITH, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND POLITICAL POWER: PUBLIC OPINION, ELECTIONS, 
AND DEMOCRACY 89–114 (2000) (asserting that business does not prevail over an 
interested public). 
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created by coal combustion. A Trump administration EPA may well 
have the elimination of these rules at the top of its agenda. The 
evolving political landscape and the promising trend away from coal-
fired generation make it all the more important that politicians and 
the general public have a clear understanding of the salient technical 
issues. This Article is intended to help dispel misperceptions about 
the alleged conflicts between grid security, regional impacts, and EPA 
regulations. Our findings suggest an evolving political economy of 
EPA regulation, particularly related to climate change. Despite the 
continuing opposition of energy managers to EPA rules, there is 
considerable variation in the nature and degree of their opposition. 
Indeed, their constructive engagement with EPA in response to the 
three rules examined suggests that there is room for adjustment on 
both sides. More broadly, as these rules are implemented and the 
utility sector continues to adapt to changing market and regulatory 
pressures, the politics will change—albeit incrementally—as well. 
Recognizing the valid technical concerns and separating them from 
the prevailing political debates is critically important to appreciating 
and taking advantage of the opportunities for facilitating change in 
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